I think, replied the Teacher,
that I am myself responsible for this confusion arising from different
accounts of the matter; for I did not state it as distinctly as I might
have, by introducing a certain order of consequences for our
consideration. Now, however, some such order shall, as far as it is
possible, be devised, so that our essay may advance in the way of
logical sequence and so give no room for such contradictions. We
declare, then, that the speculative, critical, and world-surveying
faculty of the soul is its peculiar property by virtue of its very
nature Reading κατὰ φύσιν
αὐτήν, καὶ
τῆς
θεοειδοῦς
χάριτος, κ. τ.
λ. with Sifanus., and that thereby the soul preserves
within itself the image of the divine grace; since our reason surmises
that divinity itself, whatever it may be in its inmost nature, is
manifested in these very things,—universal supervision and the
critical discernment between good and evil. But all those elements of
the soul which lie on the border-land ὅσα δε
τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν
μεθορί& 251·
κεῖται. Moller
(Gregorii Nysseni doctrina de hominis naturâ) remarks
rightly that Krabinger’s translation is here incorrect:
“quæcunque autem in animæ confinio posita sunt”;
and that τῆς
ψυχῆς should on the
contrary be joined closely to ὅσα. The opposition is not between elements which lie in, and
on the confines of the soul, but between the divine and adventitious
elements within the soul: μεθορί& 251· refers therefore to “good and bad,”
below.
and are capable from their peculiar nature of inclining to either of
two opposites (whose eventual determination to the good or to the bad
depends on the kind of use they are put to), anger, for instance, and
fear, and any other such-like emotion of the soul divested of which
human nature This
is no contradiction of the passage above about Moses: there it was
stated that the Passions did not belong to the essence
(ουσία) of
man. cannot be studied—all these we
reckon as accretions from without, because in the Beauty which is
man’s prototype no such characteristics are to be found. Now let
the following statement ὅδε
δὴ. The Teacher introduces
this λόγος with some
reserve. “We do not lay it down ex cathedrâ, we put it
forward as open to challenge and discussion as we might do in the
schools (ὡς ἐν
γυμνασί& 251·).” It is best then to take διαφύγοι
as a pure optative. Gregory appears in his answer to
congratulate her on the success of this “exercise.”
“To any one that reflects…your exposition…bears
sufficiently upon it the stamp of correctness, and hits the
truth.” But he immediately asks for Scripture authority. So that
this λόγος, though it
refers to Genesis, is not yet based upon Scripture. It is a
“consecutive” and consistent account of human nature: but
it is virtually identical with that advanced at the end of Book I. of
Aristotle’s Ethics. It is a piece of secular theorizing.
The sneers of cavillers may well be deprecated. Consistent, however,
with this view of the λόγος here
offered by Macrina, there is another possible meaning in ὡς ἐν
γυμνασί& 251·, κ.
τ. λ., i.e. “Let us put
forward the following account with all possible care and
circumspection, as if we were disputing in the schools; so that
cavillers may have nothing to find fault with”: ὡς ἂν
expressing purpose, not a wish. The cavillers will
thus refer to sticklers for Greek method and metaphysics: and
Gregory’s congratulation of his sister’s lucidity and grasp
of the truth will be all the more significant. be offered as a
mere exercise (in interpretation). I pray that it may escape the sneers
of cavilling hearers. Scripture informs us that the Deity proceeded by
a sort of graduated and ordered advance to the creation of man. After
the foundations of the universe were laid, as the history records, man
did not appear on the earth at once; but the creation of the brutes
preceded his, and the plants preceded them. Thereby Scripture shows
that the vital forces blended with the world of matter according to a
gradation; first, it infused itself into insensate nature; and in
continuation of this advanced into the sentient world; and then
ascended to intelligent and rational beings. Accordingly, while all
existing things must be either corporeal or spiritual, the former are
divided into the animate and inanimate. By animate, I mean possessed of
life: and of the things possessed of life, some have it with sensation,
the rest have no sensation. Again, of these sentient things, some have
reason, the rest have not. Seeing, then, that this life of sensation
could not possibly exist apart from the matter which is the subject of
it, and the intellectual life could not be embodied, either, without
growing in the sentient, on this account the creation of man is related
as coming last, as of one who took up into himself every single form of
life, both that of plants and that which is seen in brutes. His
nourishment and growth he derives from vegetable life; for even in
vegetables such processes are to be seen when aliment is being drawn in
by their roots and given off in fruit and leaves. His sentient
organization he derives from the brute creation. But his faculty of
thought and reason is incommunicable Following the order and stopping of Krabinger, ἄμικτόν ἐστι
καὶ ἰδιάζον
ἐπὶ ταύτης
τῆς φύσεως,
ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, κ.
τ. λ., and is a
peculiar gift in our nature, to be considered by itself. However, just
as this nature has the instinct acquisitive of the necessaries to
material existence—an instinct which, when manifested in us men,
we call Appetite—and as we admit this appertains to the vegetable
form of life, since we can notice it there too like so many impulses
working naturally to satisfy themselves with their kindred aliment and
to issue in germination, so all the peculiar conditions of the brute
creation are blended with the intellectual part of the soul. To them,
she continued, belongs anger; to them belongs fear; to them all those
other opposing activities within us; everything except the faculty
of reason and thought. That alone, the choice product, as has been
said, of all our life, bears the stamp of the Divine character. But
since, according to the view which we have just enunciated, it is not
possible for this reasoning faculty to exist in the life of the body
without existing by means of sensations, and since sensation is already
found subsisting in the brute creation, necessarily as it were, by
reason of this one condition, our soul has touch with the other things
which are knit up with it Reading διὰ
τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ
πρὸς τὰ
συνημμένα
τούτῳ (for
τούτων),
with Sifanus.; and these are all
those phænomena within us that we call “passions”;
which have not been allotted to human nature for any bad purpose at all
(for the Creator would most certainly be the author of evil, if in
them, so deeply rooted as they are in our nature, any
necessities of wrong-doing were found), but according to the use which
our free will puts them to, these emotions of the soul become the
instruments of virtue or of vice. They are like the iron which is being
fashioned according to the volition of the artificer, and receives
whatever shape the idea which is in his mind prescribes, and becomes a
sword or some agricultural implement. Supposing, then, that our reason,
which is our nature’s choicest part, holds the dominion over
these imported emotions (as Scripture allegorically declares in the
command to men to rule over the brutes), none of them will be active in
the ministry of evil; fear will only generate within us obedience Cf.
De Hom. Opif. c. xviii. 5. “So, on the contrary, if reason
instead assumes sway over such emotions, each of them is transmuted to
a form of virtue: for anger produces courage; terror, caution; fear,
obedience; hatred, aversion from vice; the power of love, the desire
for what is truly beautiful, &c.” Just below, the allusion is
to Plato’s charioteer, Phædrus, p. 253 C, and the old
custom of having the reins round the driver’s waist is to be
noticed., and anger fortitude, and cowardice caution;
and the instinct of desire will procure for us the delight that is
Divine and perfect. But if reason drops the reins and is dragged behind
like a charioteer who has got entangled in his car, then these
instincts are changed into fierceness, just as we see happens amongst
the brutes. For since reason does not preside over the natural impulses
that are implanted are implanted. All the Codd.
have ἐγκειμένης
here, instead of the ἐγκωμιαζομένης
of the Paris Edition, which must be meant for
ἐγκωμαζομένης
(itself a vox nihili), “run riot in
them.” in them, the more
irascible animals, under the generalship of their anger, mutually
destroy each other; while the bulky and powerful animals get no good
themselves from their strength, but become by their want of reason
slaves of that which has reason. Neither are the activities of their
desire for pleasure employed on any of the higher objects; nor does any
other instinct to be observed in them result in any profit to
themselves. Thus too, with ourselves, if these instincts are not turned
by reasoning into the right direction, and if our feelings get the
mastery of our mind, the man is changed from a reasoning into an
unreasoning being, and from godlike intelligence sinks by the force of
these passions to the level of the brute.