But here several things may be noted:
First, When it is said, that some subordinateends may be more valued than some ultimate
ends, it is not supposed that ever a subordinate end is more valued than that to which it is
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subordinate. For that reason it is called a subordinate end, because it is valued and sought
not for its own sake, but only in subordination to a further end. But yet a subordinate end
may be valued more than some other ultimate end that it is not subordinate to. Thus, for
instance, a man goes a journey to receive a sum of money, only for the value of the pleasure
and honour that the money may be a means of. In this case it is impossible that the subor-
dinate end, viz. his having the money, should be more valued by him than the pleasure and
honour for which he values it. It would be absurd to suppose that he values the means more
than the end, when he has no value for the means, but for the sake of the end of which it is
the means. But yet he may value the money, though but a subordinate end, more than some
other ultimate end to which it is not subordinate, and with which it has no connexion. For
instance, more than the comfort of a friendly visit, which was one ultimate end of his journey.
Secondly, The ultimate end is always superior to its subordinate end, and more valued
by the agent, unless it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the subordinate. If he
has no other means by which to obtain his last end, then the subordinate may be as much
valued as the last end; because the last end, in such a case, altogether depends upon, and is
wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for instance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar
appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of
hers, at a distance—and she goes a journey to her friend’s house or garden, to obtain that
fruit—the ultimate end of her journey is to gratify that strong appetite; the obtaining that
fruit, is the subordinate end of it. If she looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by
no other means than the obtaining of that fruit; and that it will certainly be gratified if she
obtain it, then she will value the fruit as much as she values the gratification of her appetite.
But otherwise, it will not be so. If she be doubtful whether that fruit will satisfy her craving,
then she will not value it equally with the gratification of her appetite itself. Or if there be
some other fruit that she knows of, that will gratify her desire, at least in part, which she can
obtain without such trouble as shall countervail the gratification—or if her appetite cannot
be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without something else to be compounded
with it—then her value for her last end will be divided between these several ingredients as
so many subordinate ends, and no one alone will be equally valued with the last end. Hence
it rarely happens, that a subordinate end is equally valued with its last end; because the ob-
taining of a last end rarely depends on one single, uncompounded means, and infallibly
connected with it. Therefore, men’s last ends are commonly their highest ends.
Thirdly, If any being has but one ultimate end, in all that he does, and there be a great
variety of operations, his last end may justly be looked upon as his supreme end. For in such
a case, every other end but that one, is in order to that end; and therefore no other can be
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Introduction—Explanation of terms.