something be professed, no more is professed than the words of the profession signify or
import.
II. If a man declare or profess any particular thing by words which have no distinguishing
signification, or without any signs or discriminating marks by which men may be enabled
to distinguish what he means, his words are vain to the pretended purpose, and wholly fail
of answering the end of words, which is to convey the thing meant to others’ understanding,
or to give notice to others of the thing supposed or understood. 401
Therefore to use words thus in common conversation, is to act in a vain trifling manner,
more like children than men: but to use words thus in the sacred services of God’s house,
and solemn duties of his worship, is something much worse than children’s play. But thus
Mr. W. expressly declares, words are to be used in a public profession of religion, (p. 10. c.)
“And these words are so used in such cases, without any marks of difference, whereby we
are enabled to judge when they mean a saving faith, and when a different one.”
III. A profession made in words that are either equivocal, or general, equally signifying
several distinct things, without any marks of difference or distinction, by which we are en-
abled to judge what is meant, is not a profession or signification of any one of those several
things; nor can they afford any rational ground of understanding or apprehending any
particular thing. Thus for instance, if a man using an equivocal term, should say, that such
an evening a king was in that room, without any marks of difference or discrimination
whatsoever, by which others could discern whether, by a king, he meant the ruler of a
kingdom, or a king used in a game of chess; the words thus used would be no declaration,
that the head of a kingdom was there at such a time; nor would they give any notice of any
such thing to those to whom he spoke, or give them any rational ground to understand or
judge any such thing.
Or if a man should use a general term, comprehending various particular sorts, without
at all distinguishing or pointing forth any one particular sort, he thereby professes no one
particular sort. Thus if a man professes that he has metal in his pocket, not saying what sort
of metal, whether gold, silver, brass, iron, lead, or tin; his words are no profession that he
has gold.
497
So it a man professes sincerity or religion, designedly using terms of double signification,
or (which comes to the same thing) of general signification, equally signifying two entirely
distinct things, either moral sincerity, or real piety, his words are no profession of real piety;
he makes no credible profession, and indeed no profession at all of gospel holiness.
401 The Apostle Paul says, 1 Cor. xiv. 7. “Even things without life, giving sound, whether pipe or harp, except
they give a distinction in the sounds, how shall it be known what is piped or harped?” —Mr. Locke says. Hum.
Und. Vol. 2. Edit 7. p. 103. “He that uses words of any language without distinct ideas in his mind, to which he
applies them, does so far as he uses them in discourse, only make a noise without any sense or signification.”
1929
SECTION IV. Of an indeterminate profession.