to that moral evil, by which the subject becomes odious in the sight of God, and liable, as
such, to be condemned, and utterly rejected, and cursed by him. This also makes it evident,
that the state which it has been proved mankind are in, is a corrupt state in a moral sense,
that it is inconsistent with the fulfillment of the law of God, which is the rule of moral
rectitude and goodness. That tendency, which is opposite to what the moral law requires,
and prone to that which the moral law utterly forbids, and eternally condemns, is doubtless
a corrupt tendency, in a moral sense.
So that this depravity is both odious, and also pernicious, fatal and destructive, in the
highest sense; as inevitably tending to that which implies man’s eternal ruin. It shows, that
man, as he is by nature, is in a deplorable state, in the highest sense. And this proves that
men do not come into the world perfectly innocent in the sight of God, and without any
just exposedness to his displeasure. For the being by nature in a lost and ruined state, in the
highest sense, is not consistent with being by nature in a state of favour with God.
But if any should still insist on a notion of men’s good deeds exceeding their bad ones,
and that, seeing the good more than countervails the evil, they cannot be properly denom-
inated evil; all persons and things being most properly denominated from that which prevails,
and has the ascendant in them; I would say further, That if there is in man’s nature a tendency
to guilt and ill desert, in a vast overbalance to virtue and merit; or a propensity to sin, the
demerit of which is so great, that the value and merit of all the virtuous acts that ever he
performs, are as nothing to it; then truly the nature of man may be said to be corrupt and
evil.
That this is the true case, may be demonstrated by what is evident of the infinite hein-
ousness of sin against God, from the nature of things. The heinousness of this must rise in
some proportion to the obligation we are under to regard the Divine Being; and that must
be in some proportion to his worthiness of regard; which doubtless is infinitely beyond the
worthiness of any of our fellow-creatures. But the merit of our respect or obedience to God
is not infinite. The merit of respect to any being does not increase, but is rather diminished,
in proportion to the obligations we are under in strict justice to pay him that respect. There
is no great merit in paying a debt we owe, and by the highest possible obligations in strict
justice are obliged to pay; but there is great demerit in refusing to pay it. That on such ac-
counts as these, there is an infinite demerit in all sin against God, which must therefore
immensely outweigh all the merit which can be supposed to be in our virtue, I think, is
capable of full demonstration; and that the futility of the objections which some have made
against the argument, might most plainly be demonstrated. But I shall omit a particular
consideration of the evidence of this matter from the nature of things, as I study brevity,
and lest any should cry out, metaphysics! as the manner of some is, when any argument is
handled against a tenet they are fond of, with a close and exact consideration of the nature
of things. And this is not so necessary in the present case, inasmuch as the point asser-
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SECTION III. This tendency most corrupt and pernicious.