But I think we must pass over
this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of children who
amuse themselves with beginning to build houses in sand. For having
composed a portion of a paragraph, and not yet brought it to a
conclusion, he shows that the same life is without beginning and
without end, thus in his eagerness working out our own conclusion. For
this is just what we say; that the Divine life is one and continuous in
itself, infinite and eternal, in no wise bounded by any limit to its
infinity. Thus far our opponent devotes his labours and exertions to
the truth as we represent it, showing that the same life is on no side
limited, whether we look at that part of it which was before the ages,
or at that which succeeds them. But in his next remarks he returns to
his old confusion. For after saying that the same life is without
beginning and without end, leaving the subject of life, and ranging all
the ideas we entertain about the Divine life under one head, he unifies
everything. If, says he, the life is without beginning and without end,
ungenerate and indestructible, then indestructibility and ungeneracy
will be the same thing, as will also the being without beginning and
without end. And to this he adds the aid of arguments. It is not
possible, he says, for the life to be one, unless indestructibility and
ungeneracy are identical terms. An admirable “addition” on
the part of our friend. It would seem, then, that we may hold the same
language in regard to righteousness, wisdom, power, goodness, and all
such attributes of God. Let, then, no word have a meaning peculiar to
itself, but let one signification underlie every word in a list, and
one form of description serve for the definition of all. If you are
asked to define the word judge, answer with the interpretation of
“ungeneracy”; if to define justice, be ready with
“the incorporeal” as your answer. If asked to define
incorruptibility, say that it has the same meaning as mercy or
judgment. Thus let all God’s attributes be convertible terms,
there being no special signification to distinguish one from another.
But if Eunomius thus prescribes, why do the Scriptures vainly assign
various names to the Divine nature, calling God a Judge, righteous,
powerful, long-suffering, true, merciful and so on? For if none of
these titles is to be understood in any special or peculiar sense, but,
owing to this confusion in their meaning, they are all mixed up
together, it would be useless to employ so many words for the same thing,
there being no difference of meaning to distinguish them from one
another. But who is so much out of his wits as not to know that, while
the Divine nature, whatever it is in its essence, is simple, uniform,
and incomposite, and that it cannot be viewed under any form of complex
formation, the human mind, grovelling on earth, and buried in this life
on earth, in its inability to behold clearly the object of its search,
feels after the unutterable Being in divers and many-sided ways, and
never chases the mystery in the light of one idea alone. Our grasping
of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us one single assigned
path to the knowledge of God: but as it is, from the skill apparent in
the Universe, we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of that Universe,
from the large scale of the wonders worked we get the impression of His
Power; and from our belief that this Universe depends on Him, we get an
indication that there is no cause whatever of His existence; and again,
when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own
unalterable pureness as regards this: when we consider death’s
dissolution to be the worst of ills, we give the name of Immortal and
Indissoluble at once to Him Who is removed from every conception of
that kind: not that we split up the subject of such attributes along
with them, but believing that this thing we think of, whatever it be in
substance, is One, we still conceive that it has something in common
with all these ideas. For these terms are not set against each other in
the way of opposites, as if, the one existing there, the other could
not co-exist in the same subject (as, for instance, it is impossible
that life and death should be thought of in the same subject); but the
force of each of the terms used in connection with the Divine Being is
such that, even though it has a peculiar significance of its own, it
implies no opposition to the term associated with it. What opposition,
for instance, is there between “incorporeal” and
“just,” even though the words do not coincide in meaning:
and what hostility is there between goodness and invisibility? So, too,
the eternity of the Divine Life, though represented under the double
name and idea of “the unending” and “the
unbeginning,” is not cut in two by this difference of name; nor
yet is the one name the same in meaning as the other; the one points to
the absence of beginning, the other to the absence of end, and yet
there is no division produced in the subject by this difference in the
actual terms applied to it.