cording to his own definition of Chance. And if the Will designs to choose whatever it does
choose, and designs to determine itself, as he says, then it designs to determine all its designs.
Which carries us back from one design to a foregoing design determining that, and to an-
other determining that; and so on in infinitum. The very first design must be the effect of
foregoing design, or else it must be by Chance, in his notion of it.
Here another alternative may be proposed, relating to the connexion of the acts of the
Will with something foregoing that is their cause, not much unlike to the other; which is
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this: either human liberty may well stand with volitions being necessarily connected with
the views of the understanding, and so is consistent with Necessity; or it is inconsistent with
and contrary to such a connexion and Necessity. The former is directly subversive of the
Arminian notion of Liberty, consisting in freedom from all Necessity. And if the latter be
chosen, and it be said, that liberty is inconsistent with any such necessary connexion of vo-
lition with foregoing views of the understanding, it consisting in freedom from any such
Necessity of the Will as that would imply; then the Liberty of the soul consists, partly at
least, in freedom from restraint, limitation, and government, in its actings, by the under-
standing, and in Liberty and liableness to act contrary to the views and dictates of the under-
standing: and consequently the more the soul has of this disengagedness in its acting, the
more Liberty. Now let it be considered to what this brings the noble principle of human
Liberty, particularly when it is possessed and enjoyed in its perfection, viz. a full and perfect
freedom and liableness to act altogether at random, without the least connexion with, or
restraint or government by, any dictate of reason, or any thing whatsoever apprehended,
considered, or viewed by the understanding; as being inconsistent with the full and perfect
sovereignty of the Will over its own determinations.—The notion mankind have conceived
of Liberty, is some dignity or privilege, something worth claiming. But what dignity or
privilege is there, in being given up to such a wild Contingence as this, to be perfectly and
constantly liable to act unreasonably, and as much without the guidance of understanding,
as if we had none, or were as destitute of perception, as the smoke that is driven by the wind!
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SECTION XIII. Whether we suppose the volitions of moral Agents to be connected…