He says, “The Life that is
the same, and thoroughly single, must have one and the same outward
expression for it, even though in mere names, and manner, and order it
may seem to vary. For true expressions derive their precision from the
subject realities which they indicate; different expressions are
applied to different realities, the same to the same; and so one or
other of these two things must of necessity be held; either that the
reality indicated is quite different (if the expressions are), or else
that the indicating expressions are not different;” and there is
in this case no other subject reality besides the life of the Son,
“for one either to rest an idea upon, or to cast a different
expression upon.” Is there, I may ask, any unfitness in the words
quoted, which would prevent them being rightly spoken or written about
the Only-begotten? Is not the Son Himself also a “Life thoroughly
single”? Is there not for Him also “one and the same”
befitting “expression,” “though in mere names, and
manner, and order He may seem to vary”? Must not, for Him also,
“one or other of these two things be held” fixed,
“either that the reality indicated is quite different, or else
that the indicating expressions are not different,” there being
no other subject reality, besides his life, “for one either to
rest an idea upon, or to cast a different expression upon”? We
mix up nothing here with what Eunomius has said about the Father; we
have only passed from the same accepted premise to the same conclusion
as he did, merely inserting the Son’s name instead. If, then, the
Son too is a single life, unadulterated, removed from every sort of
compositeness or complication, and there is no subject reality besides
this life of the Son (for how in that which is simple can the mixture
of anything foreign be suspected? what we have to think of along with
something else is no longer simple), and if the Father’s
substance also is a single life, and of this single life, by virtue of
its very life and its very singleness, there are no differences, no
increase or decrease in quantity or quality in it creating any
variation, it needs must be that things thus coinciding in idea should
be called by the same appellation also. If, that is, the thing that is
detected both in the Father and the Son, I mean the singleness of life,
is one, the very idea of singleness excluding, as we have said, any
variation, it needs must be that the name befitting the one should be
attached to the other also. For as that which reasons, and is mortal,
and is capable of thought and knowledge, is called “man”
equally in the case of Adam and of Abel, and this name of the nature is
not altered either by the fact that Abel passed into existence by
generation, or by the fact that Adam did so without generation, so, if
the simplicity Reading εἴπερ τὸ
ἁπλοῦν with the
editt., which is manifestly required by the sense. and incompositeness
of the Father’s life has ungeneracy for its name, in like manner
for the Son’s life the same idea will necessarily have to be
attached to the same utterance, if, as Eunomius says, “one or
other of these two things must of necessity be held; either that the
reality indicated is quite different, or else that the indicating
expressions are not different.”