ing, or new volitions in the Will; or any thing else of all the infinite number of possibles;
then certainly it would not be expected, although many millions of millions of things were
17
coming into existence in this manner, all over the face of the earth, that they should all be
only of one particular kind, and that it should be thus in all ages, and that this sort of exist-
ences should never fail to come to pass where there is room for them, or a subject capable
of them, and that constantly, whenever there is occasion.
If any should imagine, there is something in the sort of Event that renders it possible
for it to come into existence without a Cause, and should say, that the free acts of the Will
are existences of an exceeding different nature from other things; by reason of which they
may come into existence without any previous ground or reason of it, though other things
cannot: if they make this objection in good earnest, it would be an evidence of their strangely
forgetting themselves; for they would be giving an account of some ground of the existence
of a thing, when at the same time they would maintain there is no ground of its existence.
Therefore I would observe, that the particular nature of existence, be it never so diverse
from others, can lay no foundation for that thing coming into existence without a Cause;
because to suppose this, would be to suppose the particular nature of existence to be a thing
prior to the existence, and so a thing which makes way for existence, without a cause or
reason of existence. But that which in any respect makes way for a thing coming into being,
or for any manner or circumstance of its first existence, must be prior to the existence. The
distinguished nature of the effect, which is something belonging to the effect, cannot have
influence backward, to act before it is. The peculiar nature of that thing called Volition, can
do nothing, can have no influence, while it is not. And afterwards it is too late for its influence:
for then the thing has made sure of existence already, without its help.
So that it is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of the Will should
come into existence without a Cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe
of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into existence without a Cause. And if once
we allow, that such a sort of effect as a Volition may come to pass without a Cause, how do
we know but that many other sorts of effects may do so too? It is not the particular kind of
effect that makes the absurdity of supposing it has being without a Cause, but something
which is common to all things that ever begin to be, viz. That they are not self- existent, or
necessary in the nature of things.
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SECTION III. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular,…