Testimonia

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any thing else, neither fallibility nor certainty in any thing at all, any other way, than by constant experience by our Senses. That is, when our Senses make such or such representa- tions, we constantly experience, that things are in themselves thus or thus. So, when a thing appears after such a manner, I judge it to be at least two rods off, at least two feet broad; but I only know, by constant experience, that a thing, that makes such a representation, is so far off, and so big. And so my senses are as certain in every thing, when I have equal oppor- tunity and occasion to experience. And our senses are said to deceive us in some things, because our situation does not allow us to make trial, or our circumstances do not lead us to it, and so we are apt to judge by our experience, in other and different cases. Thus, our Senses make us think, that the Moon is among the clouds, because we cannot try it so quick, easily, and frequently, as we do the distance of things, that are nearer. But the Senses of an Astronomer, who observes the Parallax of the Moon, do not deceive him, but lead him to the truth. Though the idea of the Moon’s distance will never be exercised, so quick and naturally, upon every occasion, because of the tediousness and infrequency of the trial; and there are not so many ways of trial, so many differences in the Moon’s appearance, from what a lesser thing amongst the clouds would have, as there are in things nearer. I can re- member when I was so young, that seeing two things in the same building, one of which was twice so far off as the other, yet seeing one over the other, I thought they had been of the same distance, one right over the other. My senses then were deceitful in that thing, though they made the same representations as now, and yet now they are not deceitful. The only difference is in experience. Indeed, in some things, our senses make no difference in the representation, where there is a difference in the things. But in those things, our experi- ence by our Senses will lead us not to judge at all, and so they will deceive. We are in danger of being deceived by our Senses, in judging of appearances, by our experience in different things, or by judging where we have had no experience, or the like. [19.] Things, that we know by immediate Sensation, we know intuitively; and they are properly self-evident truths: as, Grass is green; The Sun shines; Honey is sweet. When we say that Grass is green, all that we can be supposed to mean by it, is—that, in a constant course, when we see Grass, the idea of green is excited by it; and this we know self-evidently. [55.] Appetite of the Mind. As all ideas are wholly in the mind, so is all Appetite. To have Appetite towards a thing is as remote from the nature of Matter, as to have Thought. There are some of the Appetites, that are called Natural Appetites, that are not indeed nat- ural to the Soul; as the Appetite to meat and drink. I believe when the Soul has that sort of pain, which is in hunger and thirst, if the Soul never had experienced that food and drink remove that pain, it would create no Appetite to any thing. A man would be just as incapable of such an Appetite, as he is to food he never smelt nor tasted. So the Appetite of scratching when it itches. 488 NO.IV. Remarks in Mental Philosophy. The Mind.

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