SECT. I.
Concerning original righteousness; and whether our first parents were created with
righteousness, or moral rectitude of heart?
The doctrine of Original Righteousness, or the creation of our first parents with holy
principles and dispositions, has a close connexion, in several respects, with the doctrine of
original sin. Dr. T. was sensible of this; and accordingly he strenuously opposes this doctrine,
in his book against original sin. And therefore in handling the subject, I would in the first
place remove this author’s main objection against this doctrine, and then show how it may
be inferred from the account which Moses gives us, in the three first chapters of Genesis.
Dr. T.‘s grand objection against this doctrine, which he abundantly insists on, is this:
that it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of virtue, that it should be concreated with any
person; because, if so, it must be by an act of God’s absolute power, without our knowledge
or concurrence; and that moral virtue, in its very nature, implieth the choice and consent
of the moral agent, without which it cannot be virtue and holiness: that a necessary holiness
is no holiness. So p. 180. where he observes, “That Adam must exist, he must be created,
yea he must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous.” (See also p. 250, 251.)
In p. 161. S. he says, “To say, that God not only endowed Adam with a capacity of being
righteous, but moreover that righteousness and true holiness were created with him, or
wrought into his nature, at the same time he was made, is to affirm a contradiction, or what
is inconsistent with the very nature of righteousness.” And in like manner Dr. Turnbull in
many places insists upon it, that it is necessary to the very being of virtue, that it be owing
to our own choice, and diligent culture.
With respect to this, I would observe, that it consists in a notion of virtue quite incon-
sistent with the nature of things, and the common notions of mankind; and also inconsistent
with Dr. T.‘s own notions of virtue. Therefore, if to affirm that to be virtue or holiness, which
is not the fruit of preceding thought, reflection, and choice, is to affirm a contradiction, I
shall show plainly, that for him to affirm otherwise, is a contradiction to himself.
In the first place, I think it a contradiction to the nature of things, as judged of by the
common sense of mankind. It is agreeable to the sense of men, in all nations and ages, not
only that the fruit or effect of a good choice is virtuous, but that the good choice itself, from
whence that effect proceeds, is so; yea, also the antecedent good disposition, temper, or af-
fection of mind, from whence proceeds that good choice, is virtuous. This is the general
notion—not that principles derive their goodness from actions, but—that actions derive
their goodness from the principles whence they proceed; so that the act of choosing what
is good, is no further virtuous, than it proceeds from a good principle, or virtuous disposition
of mind. Which supposes, that a virtuous disposition of mind may be before a virtuous act
of choice; and that, therefore, it is not necessary there should first be thought, reflection,
and choice, before there can be any virtuous disposition. If the choice be first, before the
SECTION I. Concerning Adam's original righteousness.
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SECTION I. Concerning Adam's original righteousness.