superior to it. Because, as was observed before, a subordinate end is never more valued than
the end to which it is subordinate. Moreover, the subordinate effects, or events, brought to
pass, as means of this end, all uniting to contribute their share towards obtaining the one
last end, are very various; and therefore, by what has been now observed, the ultimate end
of all must be valued more than any one of the particular means. This seems to be the case
with the works of God, as may more fully appear in the sequel.
Fourthly, Whatsoever any agent has in view in any thing he does, which is agreeable to
him in itself, and not merely for the sake of something else, is regarded by that agent as his
last end. The same may be said of avoiding that which is in itself painful or disagreeable;
for the avoiding of what is disagreeable is agreeable. This will be evident to any bearing in
mind the meaning of the terms. By last end being meant, that which is regarded and sought
by an agent, as agreeable or desirable for its own sake; a subordinate, that which is sought
only for the sake of something else.
Fifthly, From hence it will follow, that, if an agent has in view more things than one that
will be brought to pass by what he does, which he loves and delights in on their own account,
then he must have more things than one that he regards as his last ends in what he does. But
if there be but one thing that an agent seeks, on its own account, then there can be but one
last end which he has in all his actions and operations.
But only here a distinction must be observed of things which may be said to be agreeable
to an agent, in themselves considered: (1.) What is in itself grateful to an agent, and valued
on its own account, simply and absolutely considered; antecedent to, and independent of all
conditions, or any supposition of particular cases and circumstances. And, (2.) What may
be said to be in itself agreeable to an agent, hypothetically and consequentially; or, on sup-
position of such and such circumstances, or on the happening of such a particular case.
Thus, for instance, a man may originally love society. An inclination to society may be
implanted in his very nature; and society may be agreeable to him antecedent to all pre-
supposed cases and circumstances; and this may cause him to seek a family. And the comfort
of society may be originally his last end, in seeking a family. But after he has a family, peace,
good order, and mutual justice and friendship in his family, may be agreeable to him, and
what he delights in for their own sake; and therefore these things may be his last end in
many things he does in the government and regulation of his family. But they were not his
original end with respect to his family. The justice and the peace of a family was not properly
his last end before he had a family, that induced him to seek a family, but consequentially.
And the case being put of his having a family, then these things wherein the good order and
beauty of a family consist, become his last end in many things he does in such circumstances.
In like manner we must suppose that God, before he created the world, had some good
in view, as a consequence of the world’s existence, that was originally agreeable to him in
itself considered, that inclined him to bring the universe into existence, in such a manner
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Introduction—Explanation of terms.