on the other—the nearer does it approach to a person being neither blamable nor commend-
able: so that acts exerted with such preceding propensity, would be worthy of proportionably
less Praise; and when omitted, the act being attended with such difficulty, the omission
would be worthy of the less Blame. It is so, as was observed before, with natural Necessity
and impossibility, propensity and difficulty: as it is a plain dictate of the sense of all mankind,
that natural Necessity and impossibility take away all Blame and Praise; and therefore, that
the nearer the approach is to these, through previous propensity or difficulty, so Praise and
Blame are proportionally diminished. And if it were as much a dictate of common sense,
that moral Necessity of doing, or impossibility of avoiding, takes away all Praise and Blame,
as that natural Necessity or impossibility does; then, by a perfect parity of reason, it would
be as much the dictate of common sense, that an approach of moral Necessity of doing, or
impossibility of avoiding, diminishes Praise and Blame, as that an approach to natural Ne-
cessity and impossibility does so. It is equally the voice of common sense, that persons are
excusable in part, in neglecting things difficult against their Wills, as that they are excusable
wholly in neglecting things impossible against their Wills. And if it made no difference,
whether the impossibility were natural and against the Will, or moral, lying in the Will, with
regard to excusableness; so neither would it make any difference, whether the difficulty, or
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approach to Necessity, be natural, against the Will, or moral, lying in the propensity of the
Will.
But it is apparent, that the reverse of these things is true. If there be an approach to a
moral Necessity in a man’s exertion of good acts of Will, they being the exercise of a strong
propensity to good, and a very powerful love to virtue; it is so far from being the dictate of
common sense, that he is less virtuous, and the less to be esteemed, loved, and praised; that
it is agreeable to the natural notions of all mankind, that he is so much the better man,
worthy of greater respect, and higher commendation. And the stronger the inclination is,
and the nearer it approaches to Necessity in that respect; or to impossibility of neglecting
the virtuous act, or of doing a vicious one; still the more virtuous, and worthy of higher
commendation. And, on the other hand, if a man exerts evil acts of mind; as, for instance,
acts of pride or malice from a rooted and strong habit or principle of haughtiness and mali-
ciousness, and a violent propensity of heart to such acts; according to the natural sense of
men, he is so far from being the less hateful and blamable on that account, that he is so much
the more worthy to be detested and condemned, by all that observe him.
Moreover, it is manifest that it is no part of the notion, which mankind commonly have
of a blamable or praiseworthy act of the Will, that it is an act which is not determined by
an antecedent bias or motive, but by the sovereign power of the Will itself; because, if so,
the greater hand such causes have in determining any acts of the Will, so much the less
virtuous or vicious would they be accounted; and the less hand, the more virtuous or vicious.
Whereas, the reverse is true; men do not think a good act to be the less praiseworthy, for
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SECTION IV. It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of…