Now that we have laid down these
premisses, it is time to examine in the light of them the question
proposed to us. It was somewhat of this kind. “If the recompense
of blessedness is assigned according to the principles of justice, in
what class shall he be placed who has died in infancy without having
laid in this life any foundation, good or bad, whereby any return
according to his deserts may be given him?” To this we shall make
answer, with our eye fixed upon the consequences of that which we have
already laid down, that this happiness in the future, while it is in
its essence a heritage of humanity, may at the same time be called in
one sense a recompense; and we will make clear our meaning by the same
instance as before. Let us suppose two persons suffering from an
affection of the eyes; and that the one surrenders himself most
diligently to the process of being cured, and undergoes all that
Medicine can apply to him, however painful it may be; and that the
other indulges without restraint in baths For
an explanation of such a restriction, see Bingham, vol. viii. p. 109
(ed. 1720).
and wine-drinking, and listens to no advice whatever of his doctor as
to the healing of his eyes. Well, when we look to the end of each of
these we say that each duly receives in requital the fruits of his
choice, the one in deprivation of the light, the other in its
enjoyment; by a misuse of the word we do actually call that which
necessarily follows, a recompense. We may speak, then, in this way also
as regards this question of the infants: we may say that the enjoyment
of that future life does indeed belong of right to the human being, but
that, seeing the plague of ignorance has seized almost all now living
in the flesh, he who has purged himself of it by means of the necessary
courses of treatment receives the due reward of his diligence, when he
enters on the life that is truly natural; while he who refuses
Virtue’s purgatives and renders that plague of ignorance, through
the pleasures he has been entrapped by, difficult in his case to cure,
gets himself into an unnatural state, and so is estranged from the
truly natural life, and has no share in the existence which of right
belongs to us and is congenial to us. Whereas the innocent babe has no
such plague before its soul’s eyes obscuring ἐπιπροσθούσης its measure of light, and so it continues to
exist in that natural life; it does not need the soundness which comes
from purgation, because it never admitted the plague into its soul at
all. Further, the present life appears to me to offer a sort of analogy
to the future life we hope for, and to be intimately connected with it,
thus; the tenderest infancy is suckled and reared with milk from the
breast; then another sort of food appropriate to the subject of this
fostering, and intimately adapted to his needs, succeeds, until at last
he arrives at full growth. And so I think, in quantities continually
adapted to it, in a sort of regular progress, the soul partakes of that
truly natural life; according to its capacity and its power it receives
a measure of the delights of the Blessed state; indeed we learn as much
from Paul, who had a different sort of food for him who was already
grown in virtue and for the imperfect “babe.” For to the
last he says, “I have fed you with milk, and not with meat: for
hitherto ye were not able to bear it 2 Cor. iii. 2..” But to
those who have grown to the full measure of intellectual maturity he
says, “But strong meat belongeth to those that are of full age,
even those who by reason of use have their senses exercised… Heb. v. 14.” Now it is not right to say that the
man and the infant are in a similar state however free both may be from
any contact of disease (for how can those who do not partake of exactly
the same things be in an equal state of enjoyment?); on the contrary,
though the absence of any affliction from disease may be predicated of
both alike as long as both are out of the reach of its influence, yet,
when we come to the matter of delights, there is no likeness in the
enjoyment, though the percipients are in the same condition. For the
man there is a natural delight in discussions, and in the management of
affairs, and in the honourable discharge of the duties of an office,
and in being distinguished for acts of help to the needy; in living, it
may be, with a wife whom he loves, and ruling his household; and in all
those amusements to be found in this life in the way of pastime, in
musical pieces and theatrical spectacles, in the chase, in bathing, in
gymnastics, in the mirth of banquets, and anything else of that sort.
For the infant, on the contrary, there is a natural delight in its
milk, and in its nurse’s arms, and in gentle rocking that induces
and then sweetens its slumber. Any happiness beyond this the tenderness
of its years naturally prevents it from feeling. In the same manner
those who in their life here have nourished the forces of their souls
by a course of virtue, and have, to use the Apostle’s words, had
the “senses” of their minds “exercised,” will,
if they are translated to that life beyond, which is out of the body,
proportionately to the condition and the powers they have attained
participate in that divine delight; they will have more or they will
have less of its riches according to the capacity acquired. But the
soul that has never felt the taste of virtue, while it may indeed
remain perfectly free from the sufferings which flow from wickedness
having never caught the disease of evil at all, does nevertheless in
the first instance παρὰ τὴν
πρώτην (i.e. ὥραν). partake only so far
in that life beyond (which consists, according to our previous
definition, in the knowing and being in God) as this nursling can
receive; until the time comes that it has thriven on the contemplation
of the truly Existent as on a congenial diet, and, becoming capable of
receiving more, takes at will more from that abundant supply of the
truly Existent which is offered.