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Introduction to ᾽Επινοια
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It is important, for the understanding of the following Book, to determine what faculty
of the mind ᾽Επίνοια is. Eunomius, Gregory says, “makes a solemn travesty” of the word.
He reduces its force to its lowest level, and makes it only “fancy the unnatural,” either con-
tracting or extending the limits of nature, or putting heterogeneous notions together. He
instances colossi, pigmies, centaurs, as the result of this mental operation. “Fancy,” or “no-
tion,” would thus represent Eunomius’ view of it. But Gregory ascribes every art and every
science to the play of this faculty. “According to my account, it is the method by which we
discover things that are unknown, going on to further discoveries, by means of what adjoins
and follows from our first perceptionwith regard to the thing studied.” He instances Ontology
(!), Arithmetic, Geometry, on the one hand, Agriculture, Navigation, Horology, on the
other, as the result of it. “Any one who should judge this faculty more precious than any
other with the exercise of which we are gifted would not be far mistaken.” “Induction” might
almost represent this view of it. But then Gregory does not deny that “lying wonders are
also fabricated by it.” By means of it “and entertainer might amuse an audience” with fire-
breathing monsters, men enfolded in the coils of serpents, &c. He calls it an inventive faculty.
It must therefore be something more spontaneous than ratiocination, whether deductive
or inductive; while it is more reliable than Fancy or Imagination.
This is illustrated by what S. John Damascene, in his Dialectica (c. 65), says of ᾽Επίνοια:
“It is of two sorts. The first is the faculty which analyses and elucidates the view of things
undissected and in the gross (ὁλοσχερῆ): whereby a simple phenomenon becomes complex
speculatively: for instance, man becomes a compound of soul and body. The second, by a
union of perception and fancy, produces fictions out of realities, i.e. divides wholes into
parts, and combines those parts, selected arbitrarily, into new wholes; e.g. Centaurs, Sirens.”
Analysis (scientific) would describe the one; fancy, the other. Basil and Gregory were
thinking of the one, Eunomius of the other; but still both parties used the same expression.
If, then, there is one word that will cover the whole meaning, it would seem to be
“Conception.” This word at all events, both in its outward form and in its intention, stands
to perception in a way strictly analogous to that in which ᾽Επίνοια stands to ῎Εννοια. Both
Conception and ᾽Επίνοια represent some regulated operation of the mind upon data imme-
diately given. In both cases the mind is led to contemplate in a new light its own contents,
whether sensations or innate ideas. The fitness of Conception as an equivalent of ᾽Επίνοια
will be clear when we consider the real point at issue between Basil and Eunomius. Their
controversy rages round the term Ungenerate. Is it, or is it not, expressive of the substance
(being) of the Deity? To answer this question, it was found necessary to ascertain how such
a name for the Supreme has been acquired. “By a conception,” says Basil. “No,” says Euno-
mius: “it would be dangerous to trust the naming of the Deity to a common operation of
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.Introduction.
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.