And thus the Arminian notion of the freedom of the Will consisting in the soul’s determ-
ining its own acts of Will, instead of being essential to moral agency, and to men being the
subjects of moral government, is utterly inconsistent with it. For if the soul determines all
its acts of Will, it is therein subject to no Command or moral government, as has been now
observed; because its original determining act is no act of Will or choice, it being prior, by
the supposition, to every act of Will. And the soul cannot be the subject of Command in the
act of the Will itself, which depends on the foregoing determining act, and is determined
by it; inasmuch as this is necessary, being the necessary consequence and effect of that prior
determining act, which is not voluntary. Nor can the man be the subject of Command or
government in his external actions; because these are all necessary, being the necessary effects
of the acts of the Will themselves. So that mankind, according to this scheme, are subjects
of Command or moral government in nothing at all; and all their moral agency is entirely
excluded, and no room is left for virtue or vice in the world.
So that the Arminian scheme, and not that of the Calvinists, is utterly inconsistent with
moral government, and with all use of laws, precepts, prohibitions, promises, or threatenings.
Neither is there any way whatsoever to make their principles consist with these things. For
if it be said, that there is no prior determining act of the soul, preceding the acts of the Will,
but that volitions are events that come to pass by pure accident, without any determining
cause, this is most palpably inconsistent with all use of laws and precepts; for nothing is
more plain than that laws can be of no use to direct and regulate perfect accident: which,
by the supposition of its being pure accident, is in no case regulated by any thing preceding;
but happens, this way or that, perfectly by chance, without any cause or rule. The perfect
uselessness of laws and precepts also follows from the Arminian notion of indifference, as
essential to that liberty, which is requisite to virtue or vice. For the end of laws is to bind to
one side; and the end of Commands is to turn the Will one way: and therefore they are of
no use, unless they turn or bias the Will that way. But if liberty consists in indifference, then
their biassing the Will one way only, destroys liberty; as it puts the Will out of equilibrium.
So that the will, having a bias, through the influence of binding law, laid upon it, is not
wholly left to itself, to determine itself which way it will, without influence from without.
II. Having shown that the Will itself, especially in those acts which are original, leading
and determining in any case, is the proper subject of Precept and Command—and not only
those alterations in the body, &c. which are the effects of the Will—I now proceed, in the
second place, to observe, that the very opposition or defect of the Will itself, in its original
and determining act in the case, to a thing proposed or commanded, or its failing of compli-
ance, implies a moral inability to that thing: or, in other words, whenever a Command re-
quires a certain state or act of the Will, and the person commanded, notwithstanding the
Command and the circumstances under which it is exhibited, still finds his Will opposite
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SECTION IV. Command and Obligation of Obedience, consistent with moral…