as two things have equally a good will, the one cannot produce in the other an evil will.
Then remains the supposition that that which corrupted the will of the angelic nature which
first sinned, was itself an inferior thing without a will. But that thing, be it of the lowest and
most earthly kind, is certainly itself good, since it is a nature and being, with a form and
rank of its own in its own kind and order. How, then, can a good thing be the efficient cause
of an evil will? How, I say, can good be the cause of evil? For when the will abandons what
is above itself, and turns to what is lower, it becomes evil—not because that is evil to which
it turns, but because the turning itself is wicked. Therefore it is not an inferior thing which
has made the will evil, but it is itself which has become so by wickedly and inordinately de-
siring an inferior thing. For if two men, alike in physical and moral constitution, see the
same corporal beauty, and one of them is excited by the sight to desire an illicit enjoyment
while the other steadfastly maintains a modest restraint of his will, what do we suppose
brings it about, that there is an evil will in the one and not in the other? What produces it
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in the man in whom it exists? Not the bodily beauty, for that was presented equally to the
gaze of both, and yet did not produce in both an evil will. Did the flesh of the one cause the
desire as he looked? But why did not the flesh of the other? Or was it the disposition? But
why not the disposition of both? For we are supposing that both were of a like temperament
of body and soul. Must we, then, say that the one was tempted by a secret suggestion of the
evil spirit? As if it was not by his own will that he consented to this suggestion and to any
inducement whatever! This consent, then, this evil will which he presented to the evil
suasive influence,—what was the cause of it, we ask? For, not to delay on such a difficulty
as this, if both are tempted equally and one yields and consents to the temptation while the
other remains unmoved by it, what other account can we give of the matter than this, that
the one is willing, the other unwilling, to fall away from chastity? And what causes this but
their own wills, in cases at least such as we are supposing, where the temperament is
identical? The same beauty was equally obvious to the eyes of both; the same secret
temptation pressed on both with equal violence. However minutely we examine the case,
therefore, we can discern nothing which caused the will of the one to be evil. For if we say
that the man himself made his will evil, what was the man himself before his will was evil
but a good nature created by God, the unchangeable good? Here are two men who, before
the temptation, were alike in body and soul, and of whom one yielded to the tempter who
persuaded him, while the other could not be persuaded to desire that lovely body which was
equally before the eyes of both. Shall we say of the successfully tempted man that he corrup-
ted his own will, since he was certainly good before his will became bad? Then, why did he
do so? Was it because his will was a nature, or because it was made of nothing? We shall
find that the latter is the case. For if a nature is the cause of an evil will, what else can we
say than that evil arises from good or that good is the cause of evil? And how can it come
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What the Cause of the Blessedness of the Good Angels Is, and What the Cause…