Say not so, she replied; to talk
so also is blasphemous. Rather, as the Scripture tells you, say that
the one is like the other. For that which is “made in the
image” of the Deity necessarily possesses a likeness to its
prototype in every respect; it resembles it in being intellectual,
immaterial, unconnected with any notion of weight weight(ὄγκου). This is a
Platonic word: it means the weight, and then (morally) the burden, of
the body: not necessarily connected with the idea of swelling,
even in Empedocles, v. 220; its Latin equivalent is “onus”
in both meanings. Cf. Heb. xii. 1; ὄγκον
ἀποθέμενοι
πάντα, “every
weight,” or “all cumbrance.”, and in eluding any measurement of its
dimensions Reading διαστηματικὴν. Cf. 239 A.; yet as regards its own peculiar
nature it is something different from that other. Indeed, it would be
no longer an “image,” if it were altogether identical with
that other; but ἀλλ᾽
ἐν οἷς…ἐκεῖνο…τοῦτο. where we have
A in that uncreate prototype we have a in the image; just
as in a minute particle of glass, when it happens to face the light,
the complete disc of the sun is often to be seen, not represented
thereon in proportion to its proper size, but so far as the minuteness
of the particle admits of its being represented at all. Thus do the
reflections of those ineffable qualities of Deity shine forth within
the narrow limits of our nature; and so our reason, following the
leading of these reflections, will not miss grasping the Mind in its
essence by clearing away from the question all corporeal qualities; nor
on the other hand will it bring the pure pure(ἀκηράτῳ).
perishable (ἐπίκηρον). The first word is a favourite one with the Platonists; such as
Plotinus, and Synesius. Gregory uses it in his funeral speech over
Flacilla, “she passes with a soul unstained to the pure and
perfect life”; and both in his treatise De Mortuis,
“that man’s grief is real, who becomes conscious of the
blessings he has lost; and contrasts this perishing and soiled
existence with the perfect blessedness above.”
and infinite Existence to the level of that which is perishable and
little; it will regard this essence of the Mind as an object of thought
only, since it is the “image” of an Existence which is
such; but it will not pronounce this image to be identical with the
prototype. Just, then, as we have no doubts, owing to the display of a
Divine mysterious wisdom in the universe, about a Divine Being and a
Divine Power existing in it all which secures its continuance (though
if you required a definition of that Being you would therein find the
Deity completely sundered from every object in creation, whether of
sense or thought, while in these last, too, natural distinctions are
admitted), so, too, there is nothing strange in the soul’s
separate existence as a substance (whatever we may think that substance
to be) being no hindrance to her actual existence, in spite of the
elemental atoms of the world not harmonizing with her in the definition
of her being. In the case of our living bodies, composed as they are
from the blending of these atoms, there is no sort of communion, as has
been just said, on the score of substance, between the simplicity and
invisibility of the soul, and the grossness of those bodies; but,
notwithstanding that, there is not a doubt that there is in them the
soul’s vivifying influence exerted by a law which it is beyond
the human understanding to comprehend λόγῳ τινὶ
κρείττονι
τῆς
ἀνθρωπίνης
κατάνοήσεως. So just below ἀῤῥήτῳ
τινὶ λόγω. The mode of the union of soul and body is beyond our
comprehension. To refer these words to the Deity Himself
(“incomprehensible cause”), as Oehler, would make of them,
as Schmidt well remarks, a “mere showy phrase.”.
Not even then, when those atoms have again been dissolved ἀναλυθέντων. Krabinger reads ἀναλυσάντων, i.e. “returning”; as frequently in
this treatise, and in N.T. usage. into themselves, has that bond of a
vivifying influence vanished; but as, while the framework of the body
still holds together, each individual part is possessed of a soul which
penetrates equally every component member, and one could not call that
soul hard and resistent though blended with the solid, nor humid, or
cold, or the reverse, though it transmits life to all and each of such
parts, so, when that framework is dissolved, and has returned to its
kindred elements, there is nothing against probability that that simple
and incomposite essence which has once for all by some inexplicable law
grown with the growth of the bodily framework should continually remain
beside the atoms with which it has been blended, and should in no way
be sundered from a union once formed. For it does not follow that
because the composite is dissolved the incomposite must be dissolved
with it i.e.as we have already seen (p. 433).
The fact of the continuity of the soul was there deduced from its being
incomposite. So that the γὰρ here does not give the
ground for the statement immediately preceding.
Gregory (p. 431) had
suggested two alternatives:—1. That the soul dissolves with the
body. This is answered by the soul’s
“incompositeness.” 2. That the union of the immaterial soul
with the still material atoms after death cannot be maintained. This is
answered by the analogy given in the present section, of God’s
presence in an uncongenial universe, and that of the soul in the still
living body. The γὰρ therefore refers to
the answer to 1, without which the question of the soul continuing in
the atoms could not have been discussed at all..