32. The Apostle advances to the highest grade of moral abandonment,—the knowledge of God’s sentence against such crimes, united with the contented practice of them, and encouragement of them in others.
τὸδικαίωματ. è.] the sentence of God, unmistakeably pronounced in the conscience.
ὅτικ. ô. ë.] viz. that they who do such things are worthy of death; this is the sentence, and must not be enclosed in a parenthesis, as in Wetstein, Griesbach, and Scholz.
è á í Ü ô ï õ, what sort of death? Probably a general term for the fatal consequence of sin; that such courses lead to ruin. The word can hardly be pressed to its exact meaning: for many of the crimes mentioned could never be visited with judicial capital punishment in this world (as Grot.): nor could the heathen have any definite idea of eternal, spiritual death, as the penalty attached to sin (Calov.),—nor again, any idea of the connexion between sin and natural death. “Life and Death,”remarks Umbreit, “are ever set over against one another in the O. T. as well as in the N. T., the one as including all good that can befall us, the other, all evil.”p. 246
The description here given by the Apostle of the moral state of the heathen world should by all means be compared with that in Thucyd. iii. 82–84, of the moral state of Greece in the Peloponnesian war: and a passage in Wis 14:22-31, the opening of which is remarkably similar to our text: εἶτ ʼ οὐκἤρκεσετὸπλανᾶσθαιπερὶτὴντοῦθεοῦγνῶσιν, ἀλλὰ.…, Romans 1:22, and again Romans 1:27, ἡγὰρτῶνἀνωνύμωνεἰδώλωνθρησκείαπαντὸςἀρχὴκακοῦκαὶαἰτίακαὶπέραςἐστίν.