12, 13. Apart from the difficulties of some terms used, we may give the connexion thus: Such an endeavour is well worth all our ó ð ï õ ä Þ —for we have One to do with, who can discern and will punish every even the most secret disobedience. For the word of God (in what sense? 1. The λόγοςὑποστατικός, Personal Word, has been understood by many, e. g. the Fathers in general (see the copious reff. in Bleek’s note here), Œc., Thl. (as commonly supposed, but see below, and judge), Thdrt. (by no means certain), Thom. Aquin., Lyra, Cajetan, Corn. a-Lap. (“Longe aptius et melius alii intelligunt Dei Filium”), Jac. Cappellus, Owen, Le Clerc, al.
To this the first obvious objection is, that this mode of expression is confined to St. John among the N. T. writers. This, however, though clearly not to be met by alleging such passages as Luke 1:2 and Acts 20:32, is not decisive. For our Epistle, though perhaps anterior to all the writings of St. John, is yet so intimately allied to the Alexandrine terminology, that it would be no matter of surprise to find its Writer using a term so nearly ripe for his purpose as we find ὁλόγος in Philo (see below).
The real objections to the Personal ë ü ã ï ò being simply and directly here meant, lie in the Epistle, and indeed in the passage itself. In the Epistle: for we have no where in it this term used with any definiteness of our Lord, nor indeed any approach to it; not even where we might have expected it most, in the description of His relation to the Father, ch. 1 init. Every where He is the SON of God, not His Word. And in ch. Hebrews 6:5; Hebrews 11:3, that expression is changed for ῥῆμαθεοῦ, when, especially in the latter place, had the idea of the personal ë ü ã ï ò been familiar to the Writer, he would almost certainly have said νοοῦμενκατηρτίσθαιτοὺςαἰῶναςλόγῳθεοῦ, not ῥήματιθ. And in the passage itself: for such adjectives as ἐνεργής and ê ñ é ô é ê ü ò, and even ζῶν, as matter of emphatic predication, would hardly be used of the Personal ë ü ã ï ò: and, which to my mind is stronger evidence still, had these words applied to our Lord, we should not have had him introduced immediately after, Hebrews 4:14, as Ἰησοῦντὸνυἱὸντοῦθεοῦ.
But, 2. some of the ancient, and the great mass of modern Commentators, have understood by the term, the revealed word of God, in the law and in the gospel: or in the gospel alone, as contrasted with the former dispensation. And so even some of those who elsewhere in their writings have understood it of Christ: e. g. Origen (on Matthew 19:12, tom. xv. 4, vol. iii. p. 656, εἰτὸνλόγοντιςἀναλαβὼντὸνζῶντακ. ἐνεργῆκ. ô. ë., … ἐκτέμνοιτὸτῆςψυχῆςπαθητικόν: on Romans 12:7, lib. ix. 3, vol. iv. p. 650: “Verbum Dei omnia, etiam quæin occulto sunt, perscrutatur: maxime cum vivens sit, et efficax &c. …etenim cum moralis in ecclesia sermo tractatur, tunc uniuscujusque intra semetipsam conscientia stimulatur” &c.), Euseb., Aug[28] Civ. Dei xx. 21. 2 (vol. vii.) al. But neither does this interpretation seem to meet the requirements of the passage. The qualities here predicated of the ë ü ã ï ò do not appear to fit the mere written word: nor does the introduction of the written word suit the context.
I should be rather disposed with Bleek to understand, 3. the spoken word of God, the utterance of His power, by which, as in ch. Hebrews 11:3, He made the worlds,—by which His Son, as in ch. Hebrews 1:3, upholds all things. This spoken word it was, which they of old were to hear and not harden their hearts: ó Þ ì å ñ ï í, ἐὰντῆςφωνῆςαὐτοῦἀκούσητεκ. ô. ë.: this spoken word, which interdicted them from entering into His rest— ὤμοσαἐντῇὀργῇμουΕἰεἰσελεύσονταιεἰςτὴνκατάπαυσίνμου. It seems then much more agreeable to the context, to understand this utterance of God, so nearly connected with God Himself, the breath of his mouth: and I would not at the same time shrink from the idea, that the Alexandrine form of expression respecting the ë ü ã ï ò, that semi-personification of it without absolutely giving it hypostatical existence, was before the mind of the Writer. Indeed, I do not see how it is possible to escape this inference, in the presence of such passages as this of Philo, Quis Rer.
Div. Hær. § 26, vol. i. p. 491, ἵναἐννοῇςθεὸντέμνοντα, τάςτετῶνσωμάτωνκαὶπραγμάτωνἑξῆςἁπάσαςἡρμόσθαικαὶἡνῶσθαιδοκούσαςφύσεις, τῷτομεῖτῶνσυμπάντωναὐτοῦλόγῳ, ὃςεἰςτὴνὀξυτάτηνἀκονηθεὶςἀκμήν, διαιρῶνοὐδέποτελήγειτὰαἰσθητὰπάντα, ἐπειδὰνδὲμέχριτῶνἀτόμωνκαὶλεγομένωνἀμερῶνδιεξέλθῃκ. ô. ë.: and again, ib. § 27, p. 492, οὕτωςὁθεὸςἀκονησάμενοςτὸντομέατῶνσυμπάντωναὐτοῦλόγον, διαιρεῖτήντεἄμορφονκαὶἄποιοντῶνὅλωνοὐσίαν. See, on the whole, Delitzsch’s note.
[28] Augustine, Bp. of Hippo, 395–430
The idea of Ebrard, that this word, meaning the gospel, is introduced to give weight to ó ð ï õ ä Ü ó ù ì å í —“Let us do our part, for the gospel of God is not wanting in power on its part,”is too absurd to need refutation or even mention, were it not for his name) is living (not, in contrast with the dead works of the law (Ebr.), of which there is no question here; nor, as Carpzov, nourishing, and able to preserve life: nor enduring, as Abresch and Schlichting: but as E. V., quick, i. e. having living power, in the same sense in which God himself is so often called “the living God,”e. g. ch. Hebrews 10:31. So in reff.: so Soph. Œd. Tyr. 482, speaking of the prophecies, τὰδ ʼ ἀεὶζῶνταπεριποτᾶται, where the Schol. has, ἰσχύοντατῇἀληθείᾳ. Thl., who besides finds in ζῶν a proof of the hypostatic Personality, says well: ὥσπερτότε, ö ç ó ß í, οὐπόλεμος, οὐμάχαιρααὐτοὺςἀπώλεσεν, ἀλλ ʼ ὁτοῦθεοῦλόγος, αὐτόματοιγὰρκατέπιπτον, οὕτωκαὶἐφ ʼ ἡμῖνἔσται. ὁγὰραὐτὸςλόγοςκαὶἐκείνουςἐκόλασεκαὶἡμᾶςκολάσειζῇγὰρἀεὶκαὶοὐκἔσβεσται.
The emphatic position of ζῶν, the omission of ἐστι, the frequent repetition of ê á ß, all tend to increase the rhythm and rhetorical force of the sentence. Some have thought that the Writer was citing from some other source: but for this there does not appear any reason) and active (= ἐνεργός, which is the commoner form (see Bleek), found in Xen., Demosth., and often in Polybius, in which latter however the mss. often give us ἐνεργής. In one place, xi. 23. 2, this latter seems undoubted,— ἐνεργῆποιούμενοιτὴνἔφοδον. It is a word of the ê ï é í Þ or Macedonian dialect. This activity is the very first quality and attribute of life: so that the predicates form a climax: not only living, but energizing: not only energizing, but ô ï ì þ ô å ñ ï ò ê. ô. ë.: and not only that, but ä é ú ê í ï ý ì å í ï ò ê. ô. ë.: nor that only, but reaching even to the spirit, κριτικὸςἐνθυμήσεωνκ. ἐννοιῶνκαρδίας ), and sharper ( ô ï ì ü ò, an adj. formed from ô Ý ì í ù, is found in Plato, Tim. 61 E: Plut. Sympos. vi. 8; viii. 9: its comparative in ref., and Lucian, Toxar. ii. al.: the superlative, in the well-known exordium of Ajax’s dying speech, Soph.
Aj. 815) than (Bleek has shewn that the construction τομώτεροςὑπὲρμάχαιραν, for τόμοςὑπὲρμ. or ô ï ì þ ô å ñ ï ò ì á ÷ á ß ñ á ò, is not Hebraistic; for in Heb. there is no comparative; we have it in ref. Judges, ἀγαθώτεροςσὺὑπὲρΒαλὰκυἱὸνΖεπφώρ: and the similar construction with ð á ñ Ü in ch. Hebrews 1:4, where see remarks) every two-edged sword (lit. two-mouthed: meaning, sharpened on both sides, both edge and back. The expression (reff.) is found in classic poetry, e. g. ä ß ó ô ï ì ï í î ß ö ï ò, Eurip. Hel. 992: ä ß ó ô ï ì á ö Ü ó ã á í á, id. Orest. 1296, and other instances in Bleek.
The more usual word is ἀμφήκης, Il. ê. 256: Soph. Aj. 286: Electr. 485. We have ἀμφίθηκτος, Antig. 1309. As regards the comparison itself, of the word of God or of men to a sword, it is common in Scripture: see Psalms 57:4; Psalms 59:7; Psalms 64:3; Wis 18:15-16; Revelation 1:16; and above all, Ephesians 6:17. It has been questioned, whether the office here ascribed to the word of God is punitive, or merely searching: whether it regards the foes, or the servants of God. There seems no reason why we should separate the two.
The same WORD, to which evidently by the succeeding clause is attributed the searching power, is powerful also to punish. The ì Ü ÷ á é ñ á belongs to the surgeon, and to the judge: has its probing as well as its smiting office. And so Chrys.: αὐτὸςτὰἐντῇκαρδίᾳκρίνειἐκεῖγὰρδιαβαίνεικαὶκολάζωνκαὶἐξετάζων. Bleek points out the close relation of this similitude to a series of passages in Philo, especially in the treatise Quis Rerum Divinarum Hæres. There, in speaking of Abraham’s sacrifice, and explaining διεῖλεναὐτὰμέσα, which act he refers to God, he says: τῷτομεῖτῶνσυμπάντωναὐτοῦλόγῳὅς, εἰςτὴνὀξυτάτηνἀκονηθεὶςἀκμήν, διαιρῶνοὐδέποτελήγειτὰαἰσθητὰπάντα, ἐπειδὰνδὲμέχριτῶνἀτόμωνκαὶλεγομένωνἀμερῶνδιεξέλθῃ, πάλινἀπὸτούτωντὰλόγῳθεωρητὰεἰςἀμυθήτουςκαὶἀπεριγράφουςμοίραςἄρχεταιδιαιρεῖνοὗτοςὁτομεύς, § 26, vol. i. p. 491. And further on, he divides these ä é ÷ ï ô ï ì Þ ì á ô á made by the ë ü ã ï ò into triads, and says, ψυχὴγὰρτριμερήςἐστι, δίχαδὲἕκαστοντῶνμερῶν, ὡςἐδείχθη, τέμνεταιμοιρῶνδὲγινομένωνἕξ, ἕβδομοςεἰκότωςτομεὺςἦνἁπάντων, ὁἱερὸςκαὶθεῖοςλόγος.
From these and similar passages (cf. esp. Quod Deterior Potiori Insid. § 29, p. 212: De Cherubim, § 9, p. 144 ff.), we may reasonably infer, that the writings of Philo were not unknown to the Writer of this Epistle. The same conclusion has been also drawn by Grotius and Bleek. See Prolegg. §i. 155), and reaching through (so ἱκνεῖταιλόγοςδιὰστήθεων, Æsch. Sept. c. Theb. 515: διικνεῖσθαιδι ʼ ὤτωνποτὶτὰνψυχάν, Tim.
Locr. p. 101 A: ἡδόξαδιῖκτομέχριβασιλέως, Plut. Dem. 20) even to dividing of soul and spirit, both joints and marrow (there has been considerable diversity in the taking of these genitives. I have regarded them as follows: ψυχῆς and ð í å ý ì á ô ï ò, not coupled by ô å ê á ß, but only by ê á ß, denote two separate departments of man’s being, each subordinate to the process indicated by μερισμοῦ. The ë ü ã ï ò pierces to the dividing, not of the ø õ ÷ Þ from the πνεῦμα, but of the ø õ ÷ Þ itself and of the πνεῦμα itself: the former being the lower portion of man’s invisible part, which he has in common with the brutes, the ἄλογοντῆςψυχῆς of Philo; the latter the higher portion, receptive of the Spirit of God, the λογικὸντῆςψυχῆς of the same; both which are pierced and divided by the sword of the Spirit, the word of God. Then, passing on to ἁρμῶντεκ. μυελῶν, I do not regard these terms as co-ordinate with the former ψυχῆςκ. ð í å ý ì á ô ï ò, but as subordinate to them, and as used in a spiritual sense, not a corporeal (as many Commentators and recently Delitzsch): implying that both the ἁρμοί and the ì õ å ë ï ß of the ø õ ÷ Þ and of the πνεῦμα are pierced and divided by the ë ü ã ï ò. This I conceive is necessitated both by the ô å, expressed in this second clause, and by the sense, which otherwise would degenerate into an anti-climax, if ἁρμῶντεκ. μυελῶν were to be understood of the body. (The metaphorical sense of ì õ å ë ü ò is amply justified by such expressions as εἰσδεδυκυῖα ( ὀδύνη ) εἰςαὐτὸντὸνμυελὸντῆςψυχῆς, Themist.
Orat. 32, p. 357: χρῆνγὰρμετρίαςεἰςἀλλήλουςφιλίαςθνητοὺςἀνακίρνασθαικαὶμὴπρὸςἀκρὸνμυελὸνψυχῆς, Eur. Hippol. 255 ff. And ἁρμός is not an anatomical, but a common term, which might be applied to any kind of compages, as ἁρμὸςθύρας, Dion. Hal. Hebrews 4:7; ἁρμοὶλίθων, ref. Sir. &c.) This, which is in the main the sense given by Grot., Kuin., Bl., De W., Lünem. (nearly also of Hofmann, Schriftbeweis, i. p. 258 f., who somewhat harshly makes the genitives ψυχῆςκ. ð í å ý ì á ô ï ò dependent on ἁρμῶντεκ. μυελῶν ), being laid down, I proceed to examine the divergences from it. 1.
That which regards the ì å ñ é ó ì ü ò as being a division of the soul from the spirit, the joints from the marrow (on this latter see below). This is given as early as by Chrys. as an alternative: ἡγὰρὅτιτὸπνεῦμαδιαιρεῖἀπὸτῆςψυχῆς, λέγειἢὅτικαὶαὐτῶντῶνἀσωμάτωνδιικνεῖται. And Œc., understanding πνεῦμα of the Holy Spirit: ἡγοῦμαιοὖννῦντοῦτοεἰρῆσθαι, ὅτιχωρισμὸνἐργάζεταιτοῦἁγίουπνεύματος, ê. ἀφαιρεῖταιαὐτὸἀπὸτῆςψυχῆς: and so, but giving the alternative, Thl. And so Erasm.-paraph. (“adeo ut dissecet animam a spiritu”), J. Cappellus, Wolf, Bengel, al. The objections to this are both psychological and contextual.
It has been rightly urged (see especially Ebrard’s note here) that the soul and spirit cannot be said to be separated in any such sense as this: and on the other hand, the ἁρμοί and ì õ å ë ï ß could not be thus said to be separated, having never been in contact with one another. 2. Many Commentators, who hold the division of soul from spirit, are not prepared to apply the same interpretation to the ἁρμῶντ. ê. μυελῶν; although, reading the former ô å, it becomes philologically necessary that the two clauses should be strictly parallel. Not reading the former ô å, it becomes possible to make ἁρμῶντεκ. μυελῶν dependent, not on μερισμοῦ but on ἄχρι, which has been done by Cyril of Alexandria, de Fest. Pasch. Hom. xxii. vol. x. p. 275 b, καθικνεῖταιδὲκαὶμέχριςἁρμῶντεκαὶμυελῶν, and De Adorat. xvi. vol. i. p. 561, μέχριςἁρμῶντεκ. μυελῶντὸντοῦθεοῦκαθικνεῖσθαιλόγον, and Schlichting (see below), C. F.
Schmid, Paulus, al. But certainly, had this been meant, the ἄχρις would have been repeated before ἁρμῶν. Otherwise it would be exceedingly harsh. 3. Many understand μερισμοῦ to mean, not the act of division, but the place where the division occurs. So Böhme, “Ita ut per intervalla, si quæsint, animæanimique, et compagum medullarumque penetret, seque insinuet:”Schlichting, “Ad loca usque abditissima ubi anima cum spiritu connectitur, itemque ubi sunt membrorum compages et medullæ.”And so, more recently, Ebrard. The objection to this is, partly the omission of what would in that case be the requisite article before μερισμοῦ, and partly as before, that thus ἁρμ. ô. ê. ì õ. must be constructed with ἄχρι: see above. 4.
One meaning is given by Œc. (after Cyril: ὁἐνἁγίοιςΚύριλλοςἐνπροσφόρῳχωρίῳκαὶοὕτωςἐδέξατο … τὸπερὶτοῦθεοῦκήρυγμαδιαιρεῖφησὶκαὶμερίζειτὰτῆςψυχῆςμέρη, δεκτικὴνποιῶνκ. χωρητικὴντῶνἀκουομένων ), and Thl. (but not approved by the latter, as Bl. who has been misled by the Latin: for he says τινὲςδὲοὕτωςἐδέξαντοτὸνλόγον, ἐμοὶδοκεῖνοὐκἀκολούθωςτῷἀποστολικῷσκοπῷ, and then proceeds as Œc., except that he puts τοῦμυστηρίου for τῶνἀκουομένων ). But clearly this cannot be the meaning, with ã Ü ñ after a caution), and a judger (or, discerner: not as Kuinoel, condemner. The word is good Greek, as a simple predicate: so Plato, Pol. 260 C, τὸκριτικὸνμέρος: with a gen., it seems to be of later usage: Palm and Rost quote ὀφθαλμοὶκριτικοὶτοῦκάλλους from Basil the Great: but the government of a gen. by verbals in - é ê ü ò is regular: we have παρασκευαστικὸςτῶνεἰςτὸνπόλεμον, ê. ποριστικὸςτῶνἐπιτηδείων, Xen. Mem. iii. 1. 6: διδασκαλικὸςτῆςαὐτοῦσοφίας, Plato, Euthyph. p. 3 C: see Kühner, § 530 h h; it is the genitivus materiæ) of (the) thoughts ( ἐνθύμημα is the commoner word: but Thucyd. (i. 123), Eurip. (Frag. 20), Isæus, and Aristotle (Bl.) use - ç ó é ò in much the same sense; - ç ó é ò being properly the action of the thought itself, - ç ì á the thing conceived or thought of. But these two become frequently confused in later Greek) and ideas (this seems the nearest term to ἔννοια. Plato gives rather a mysterious definition of it— ó õ í ô ï í ß á ä é á í ï ß á ò.
But the usage, where the word wavers, as here, between the process in the mind itself and that which is the result of the process, points very much to our ‘idea.’Thus ἔννοιανλαμβάνειντινός, Demosth. p. 157 18: ἡκοινὴἔννοιάτινος, Polyb. x. 27. 8. In ib. i. 4. 9, we have ἔννοια distinguished from ἐπιστήμη: ἔννοιανμὲνγὰρλαβεῖνἀπὸμέρουςτῶνὅλωνδυνατόνἐπιστήμηνδὲκαὶγνώμηνἀτρεκῆἔχειν, ἀδύνατον. Certainly the “intentiones”of the vulg. (“intents,”E. V.), though apparently answering to the Platonic definition, does not give it here (though this seems the sense in 1 Peter 4:1), nor does “consilia”of Erasmus: “conceptus”of Crell. is better. Bengel says, “ ἐνθύμησις, intentio, involvit affectum; ἔννοια, cogitatio, quædicit simplicius, prius et interius quiddam.”But though strictly speaking this might be the meaning of ἐνθύμησις ( ἐνθυμῷ ), it does not carry so much in ordinary usage) of the heart (the inner and thinking and feeling part of man in Scripture psychology; die innere Mitte des menschlichen Wesenbestandes, in welcher das dreifache Leben des Menschen zusammenläuft, Delitzsch, biblische Psychologie, § 12 init., which see; and Beck, Umriss der biblischen Seelenlehre, p. 63 ff.):