Section VIII.
Concerning the supposed Liberty of the will, as opposite to all Necessity.
IT is chiefly insisted on by Arminians, in this controversy, as a thing most
important and essential in human Liberty, that volitions, or the acts of the will,
are contingent events; understanding contingence as opposite, not only to constraint,
but to all Necessity. Therefore I would particularly consider this matter.
And, first, I would inquire, whether there
is or can be any such thing, as a volition which is contingent in such a sense,
as not only to come to pass without any Necessity of constraint or co-action, but
also without a Necessity of consequence, or an infallible connexion with any thing
foregoing.— Secondly, Whether, if it were so, this would at all help the cause
of Liberty.
I. I would consider whether volition is
a thing that ever does or can come to pass, in this manner, contingently.
And here it must be remembered, that it
has been already shown, that nothing can ever come to pass without a cause, or a
reason, why it exists in this manner rather than another; and the evidence of this
has been particularly applied to the acts of the will. Now if this be so, it will
demonstrably follow, that the acts of the will are never contingent, or without
necessity, in the sense spoken of; inasmuch as those things which have a cause,
or a reason of their existence, must be connected with their cause. This appears
by the following considerations.
1. For an event to have a cause and ground
of its existence, and yet not to be connected with its cause, is an inconsistence.
For if the event be not connected with the cause, it is not dependent on the cause;
its existence is as it were loose from its influence, and may attend it, or may
not; it being a mere contingence, whether it follows or attends the influence of
the cause, or not: And that is the same thing as not to he dependent on it. And
to say, the event is not dependent on its cause, is absurd; it is the same thing
as to say, it is not its cause, nor the event the effect of it; for dependence on
the influence of a cause is the very notion of an effect. If there be no such relation
between one thing and another, consisting in the connexion and dependence of one
thing an the influence of another, then it is certain there is no such relation
between them as is signified by the terms cause and effect. So far as an event is
dependent on a cause, and connected with it, so much causality is there in the case,
and no more. The cause does, or brings to pass, no more in any event, than is dependent
on it. If we say, the connexion and dependence is not total, but partial, and that
the effect, though it has some connexion and dependence, yet is not entirely dependent
on it; that is the same thing as to say, that not all that is in the event is an
effect of that cause, but that only part of it arises from thence, and part some
other way.
2. If there are some events which are not
necessarily connected with their causes, then it will follow, that there are some
things which come to pass without any cause, contrary to the supposition. For if
there be any event which was not necessarily connected with the influence of the
cause under such circumstances, then it was contingent whether it would attend or
follow the influence of the cause, or no; it might have followed, and it might not,
when the cause was the same, its influence the same, and under the same circumstances.
And if so, why did it follow, rather than not follow? Of this there is no cause
or reason. Therefore here is something without any cause or reason why it is, viz.
the following of the effect on the influence of the cause, with which it was not
necessarily connected. If there be no necessary connexion of the effect on any thing
antecedent, then we may suppose that sometimes the event will follow the cause,
and sometimes not, when the cause is the same, and in every respect in the same
state and circumstances. And what can be the cause and reason of this strange phenomenon,
even this diversity, that in one instance, the effect should follow, in another
not? It is evident by the supposition, that this is wholly without any cause or
ground. Here is something in the present manner of the existence of things, and
state of the world, that is absolutely without a cause. Which is contrary to the
supposition, and contrary to what has been before demonstrated.
3. To suppose there are some events which
have a cause and ground of their existence, that yet are not necessarily connected
with their cause, is to suppose that they have a cause which is not their cause.
Thus; if the effect be not necessarily connected with the cause, with its influence,
and influential circumstances; then, as I observed before, it is a thing possible
and supposable, that the cause may sometimes exert the same influence, under the
same circumstances, and yet the effect not follow. And if this actually happens
in any instance, this instance is a proof, in fact, that the influence of the cause
is not sufficient to produce the effect. For if it had been sufficient, it would
have done it. And yet, by the supposition, in another instance, the same cause,
with perfectly the same influence, and when all circumstances which have any influence
are the same, it was followed with the effect. By which it is manifest, that the
effect in this last instance was not owing to the influence of the cause, but must
come to pass some other way. For it was proved before, that the influence of the
cause was not sufficient to produce the effect. And if it was not sufficient to
produce it, then the production of it could not be owing to that influence, but
must be owing to something else, or owing to nothing. And if the effect be not owing
to the influence of the cause, then it is not the cause. Which brings us to the
contradiction of a cause, and no cause, that which is the ground and reason of the
existence of a thing, and at the same time is NOT the ground and reason of
its existence.
If the matter be not already so plain as
to render any further reasoning upon it impertinent, I would say, that which seems
to be the cause in the supposed case, can be no cause; its power and influence having,
on a full trial, proved insufficient to produce such an effect: and if it be not
sufficient to produce it, then it does not produce it. To say otherwise, is to say,
there is power to do that which there is not power to do. If there be in a cause
sufficient power exerted, and in circumstances sufficient to produce an effect,
and so the effect be actually produced at one time; all these things concurring,
will produce the effect at all times. And so we may turn it the other way; that
which proves not sufficient at one time, cannot be sufficient at another, with precisely
the same influential circumstances. And therefore if the effect follows, it is not
owing to that cause; unless the different time be a circumstance which has influence:
but that is contrary to the supposition; for it is supposed that all circumstances
that have influence, are the same. And besides, this would be to suppose the time
to be the cause; which is contrary to the supposition of the other thing being the
cause. But if merely diversity of time has no influence, then it is evident that
it is as much of an absurdity to say, the cause was sufficient to produce the effect
at one time, and not at another; as to say, that it is sufficient to produce the
effect at a certain time, and yet not sufficient to produce the same effect at the
same time.
On the whole, it is clearly manifest, that
every effect has a necessary connexion with its cause, or with that which is the
true ground and reason of its existence. And therefore, if there be no event without
a cause, as was proved before, then no event whatsoever is contingent, in the manner
that Arminians suppose the free acts of the will to be contingent.