foreknown, they will happen in the order in which they have been foreknown; and if they
come to pass in this order, there is a certain order of things foreknown by God; and if a
certain order of things, then a certain order of causes, for nothing can happen which is not
preceded by some efficient cause. But if there is a certain order of causes according to which
everything happens which does happen, then by fate, says he, all things happen which do
happen. But if this be so, then is there nothing in our own power, and there is no such thing
as freedom of will; and if we grant that, says he, the whole economy of human life is subver-
ted. In vain are laws enacted. In vain are reproaches, praises, chidings, exhortations had
recourse to; and there is no justice whatever in the appointment of rewards for the good,
and punishments for the wicked. And that consequences so disgraceful, and absurd, and
pernicious to humanity may not follow, Cicero chooses to reject the foreknowledge of future
things, and shuts up the religious mind to this alternative, to make choice between two
things, either that something is in our own power, or that there is foreknowledge,—both of
which cannot be true; but if the one is affirmed, the other is thereby denied. He therefore,
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like a truly great and wise man, and one who consulted very much and very skillfully for
the good of humanity, of those two chose the freedom of the will, to confirm which he denied
the foreknowledge of future things; and thus, wishing to make men free he makes them
sacrilegious. But the religious mind chooses both, confesses both, and maintains both by
the faith of piety. But how so? says Cicero; for the knowledge of future things being granted,
there follows a chain of consequences which ends in this, that there can be nothing depending
on our own free wills. And further, if there is anything depending on our wills, we must go
backwards by the same steps of reasoning till we arrive at the conclusion that there is no
foreknowledge of future things. For we go backwards through all the steps in the following
order:—If there is free will, all things do not happen according to fate; if all things do not
happen according to fate, there is not a certain order of causes; and if there is not a certain
order of causes, neither is there a certain order of things foreknown by God,—for things
cannot come to pass except they are preceded by efficient causes,—but, if there is no fixed
and certain order of causes foreknown by God, all things cannot be said to happen according
as He foreknew that they would happen. And further, if it is not true that all things happen
just as they have been foreknown by Him, there is not, says he, in God any foreknowledge
of future events.
Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that God
knows all things before they come to pass, and that we do by our free will whatsoever we
know and feel to be done by us only because we will it. But that all things come to pass by
fate, we do not say; nay we affirm that nothing comes to pass by fate; for we demonstrate
that the name of fate, as it is wont to be used by those who speak of fate, meaning thereby
the position of the stars at the time of each one’s conception or birth, is an unmeaning word,
for astrology itself is a delusion. But an order of causes in which the highest efficiency is
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Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Free Will of Man, in Opposition…