201
and moving cause, any more than Adam’s eating of any other tree of the garden. And the
only real relation that the effect can have to that sin, is a relation as to time, viz. that it is
after it. And when the matter is closely examined, the whole amounts to no more than this,
that God is pleased, of his mere good will and pleasure, to bestow a greater favour upon us,
than he did upon Adam in innocency, after that sin of his eating the forbidden fruit; which
sin we are no more concerned in, than in the sin of the king of Pegu, or the emperor of
China.
IV. It is altogether inconsistent with the apostle’s scope, and the import of what he says,
to suppose that the death of which he here speaks, as coming on mankind by Adam’s sin,
comes not as a punishment, but only as a favour. It quite makes void the opposition, in which
the apostle sets the consequences of Adam’s sin, and the consequences of the grace and
righteousness of Christ. They are set in opposition to each other, as opposite effects, arising
from opposite causes, throughout the paragraph: one, as the just consequence of an offence;
the other, a free gift, Rom. v. 15-18. Whereas, according to this scheme, there is no such
opposition in the case; both are benefits, and both are free gifts. A very wholesome medicine
to save from perishing, ordered by a kind father, or a shield to preserve from an enemy,
bestowed by a friend, is as much a free gift as pleasant food. The death that comes by Adam,
is set in opposition to the life and happiness that comes by Christ, as being the fruit of sin,
and judgment for sin: when the latter is the fruit of divine grace, Rom. v. 15, 17, 20, 21.
Whereas, according to our author, both came by grace. Death comes on mankind by the
free kindness and love of God, much more truly and properly than by Adam’s sin. Dr. T.
speaks of it as coming by occasion of Adam’s sin: but, as I have observed, it is an occasion
without any influence. Yet the proper cause is God’s grace. So that the true cause is wholly
good. Which, by the way, is directly repugnant to the apostle’s doctrine in Rom. vii. 13.“Was
then that which is good made death unto me? God forbid. But sin, that it might appear sin,
working death in me by that which is good.” Where the apostle utterly rejects any such
suggestion, as though that which is good were the proper cause of death; and signifies that
sin is the proper cause, and that which is good, only the occasion. But according to this author,
the reverse is true: that which is good in the highest sense, even the love of God, and a divine
gracious constitution, is the proper cause of death, and sin only the occasion.
But to return, it is plain, that death by Adam, and life and happiness by Christ, are here
set in opposition: the latter being spoken of as good, the other as evil; one as the effect of
righteousness, the other of an offence; one of the fruit of obedience, the other of disobedience;
one as the fruit of God’s favour, in consequence of what was pleasing and acceptable to him,
but the other the fruit of his displeasure, in consequence of what was displeasing and hateful
to him; the latter coming by justification, the former by the condemnation of the subject.
But according to the scheme of our author, there can be no opposition in any of these re-
spects: the death here spoken of, neither comes as an evil, nor from an evil cause; either an
1090
SECTION I. Remarks on Dr. Taylor's way of explaining this text.