deavour to examine and inquire how that great variety and diversity in the world may appear
to be consistent with all righteousness and reason. I mean, of course, merely reason in
general; for it would be a mark of ignorance either to seek, or of folly to give, a special reason
for each individual case.
5. Now, when we say that this world was established in the variety in which we have
above explained that it was created by God, and when we say that this God is good, and
righteous, and most just, there are numerous individuals, especially those who, coming from
the school of Marcion, and Valentinus, and Basilides, have heard that there are souls of
different natures, who object to us, that it cannot consist with the justice of God in creating
the world to assign to some of His creatures an abode in the heavens, and not only to give
such a better habitation, but also to grant them a higher and more honourable position; to
favour others with the grant of principalities; to bestow powers upon some, dominions on
others; to confer upon some the most honourable seats in the celestial tribunals; to enable
some to shine with more resplendent glory, and to glitter with a starry splendour; to give
to some the glory of the sun, to others the glory of the moon, to others the glory of the stars;
to cause one star to differ from another star in glory. And, to speak once for all, and briefly,
if the Creator God wants neither the will to undertake nor the power to complete a good
and perfect work, what reason can there be that, in the creation of rational natures, i.e., of
beings of whose existence He Himself is the cause, He should make some of higher rank,
and others of second, or third, or of many lower and inferior degrees? In the next place,
they object to us, with regard to terrestrial beings, that a happier lot by birth is the case with
some rather than with others; as one man, e.g., is begotten of Abraham, and born of the
promise; another, too, of Isaac and Rebekah, and who, while still in the womb, supplants
his brother, and is said to be loved by God before he is born. Nay, this very circumstance,—es-
pecially that one man is born among the Hebrews, with whom he finds instruction in the
divine law; another among the Greeks, themselves also wise, and men of no small learning;
and then another amongst the Ethiopians, who are accustomed to feed on human flesh; or
amongst the Scythians, with whom parricide is an act sanctioned by law; or amongst the
people of Taurus, where strangers are offered in sacrifice,—is a ground of strong objection.
Their argument accordingly is this: If there be this great diversity of circumstances, and
this diverse and varying condition by birth, in which the faculty of free-will has no scope
(for no one chooses for himself either where, or with whom, or in what condition he is
born); if, then, this is not caused by the difference in the nature of souls, i.e., that a soul of
an evil nature is destined for a wicked nation, and a good soul for a righteous nation, what
other conclusion remains than that these things must be supposed to be regulated by accident
and chance? And if that be admitted, then it will be no longer believed that the world was
made by God, or administered by His providence; and as a consequence, a judgment of God
upon the deeds of each individual will appear a thing not to be looked for. In which matter,
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On the World and the Movements of Rational Creatures, Whether Good or Bad;…