You see, she replied, there is a
battle of the reason with them and a struggle to rid the soul of them;
and there are men in whom this struggle has ended in success; it was so
with Moses, as we know; he was superior both to anger and to desire;
the history testifying of him in both respects, that he was meek beyond
all men (and by meekness it indicates the absence of all anger and a
mind quite devoid of resentment), and that he desired none of those
things about which we see the desiring faculty in the generality so
active. This could not have been so, if these faculties were nature,
and were referable to the contents of man’s essence οὐσία.. For it is impossible for one who has come
quite outside of his nature to be in Existence at all. But if Moses was
at one and the same time in Existence and not in these conditions,
then It is
best to keep ἆρα: ἄρα is Krabinger’s
correction from four Codd.: and he reads ὁ for εἰ above: but only one class of
Codd. support these alterations. it follows that these conditions are
something other than nature and not nature itself. For if, on the one
hand, that is truly nature in which the essence of the being is found,
and, on the other, the removal of these conditions is in our power, so
that their removal not only does no harm, but is even beneficial to the
nature, it is clear that these conditions are to be numbered amongst
externals, and are affections, rather than the essence, of the nature;
for the essence is that thing only which it is. As for anger, most
think it a fermenting of the blood round the heart; others an eagerness
to inflict pain in return for a previous pain; we would take it to be
the impulse to hurt one who has provoked us. But none of these accounts
of it tally with the definition of the soul. Again, if we were to
define what desire is in itself, we should call it a seeking for that
which is wanting, or a longing for pleasurable enjoyment, or a pain at
not possessing that upon which the heart is set, or a state with regard
to some pleasure which there is no opportunity of enjoying. These and
such-like descriptions all indicate desire, but they have no connection
with the definition of the soul. But it is so with regard to all those
other conditions also which we see to have some relation to the soul,
those, I mean, which are mutually opposed to each other, such as
cowardice and courage, pleasure and pain, fear and contempt, and so on;
each of them seems akin to the principle of desire or to that of anger,
while they have a separate definition to mark their own peculiar
nature. Courage and contempt, for instance, exhibit a certain phase of
the irascible impulse; the dispositions arising from cowardice and fear
exhibit on the other hand a diminution and weakening of that same
impulse. Pain, again, draws its material both from anger and desire.
For the impotence of anger, which consists in not being able to punish
one who has first given pain, becomes itself pain; and the despair of
getting objects of desire and the absence of things upon which the
heart is set create in the mind this same sullen state. Moreover, the
opposite to pain, I mean the sensation of pleasure I
mean the sensation of pleasure. This
(νόημα) is
Krabinger’s reading: but Oehler reads from his Codd. νόσημα: and H. Schmidt suggests κίνημα,
comparing (205 A) below, “any other such-like emotion of the
soul.”, like pain, divides itself between anger and
desire; for pleasure is the leading motive of them both. All these
conditions, I say, have some relation to the soul, and yet they are not
the soul have some relation to the soul, and yet they are not the
soul. Macrina does not mean that the
Passions are altogether severed from the soul, as the following shows:
and so Oehler cannot be right in reading and translating “Das
Alles hat nichts mir der Seele zu schaffen.” The Greek
περὶ
τὴν ψυχὴν is to be parallelled by οἱ περὶ τὸν
Περικλέα, “Pericles’ belongings,” or
“party”; passing, in later Greek, almost into
“Pericles himself.”, but only like warts growing out of
the soul’s thinking part, which are reckoned as parts of it
because they adhere to it, and yet are not that actual thing which the
soul is in its essence.