However, though there is no
interval between them, he does not admit that their communion is
immediate and intimate, but condescends to the measure of our
knowledge, and converses with us in human phrase as one
of ourselves, himself quietly confessing the impotence of reasoning and
taking refuge in a line of argument that was never taught by Aristotle
and his school. He says, “It was good and proper that He should
beget His Son at that time when He willed: and in the minds of sensible
men there does not hence arise any questioning why He did not do so
before.” What does this mean, Eunomius? Are you too going afoot
like us unlettered men? are you leaving your artistic periods and
actually taking refuge in unreasoning assent? you, who so much
reproached those who take in hand to write without logical skill? You,
who say to Basil, “You show your own ignorance when you say that
definitions of the terms that express things spiritual are an
impossibility for men,” who again elsewhere advance the same
charge, “you make your own impotence common to others, when you
declare that what is not possible for you is impossible for all”?
Is this the way that you, who say such things as these, approach the
ears of him who questions about the reason why the Father defers
becoming the Father of such a Son? Do you think it an adequate
explanation to say, “He begat Him at that time when He chose: let
there be no questioning on this point”? Has your apprehensive
fancy grown so feeble in the maintenance of your doctrines? What has
become of your premises that lead to dilemmas? What has become of your
forcible proofs? how comes it that those terrible and inevitable
syllogistic conclusions of your art have dissolved into vanity and
nothingness? “He begat the Son at that time when He chose: let
there be no questioning on this point!” Is this the finished
product of your many labours, of your voluminous undertakings? What was
the question asked? “If it is good and fitting for God to have
such a Son, why are we not to believe that the good is always present
with Him Cf. S.
Basil adv. Eun. II. 12, quoted above, p. 207.?” What is the answer he makes to
us from the very shrine of his philosophy, tightening the bonds of his
argument by inevitable necessity? “He made the Son at that time
when He chose: let there be no questioning as to why He did not do so
before.” Why, if the inquiry before us were concerning some
irrational being, that acts by natural impulse, why it did not sooner
do whatever it may be,—why the spider did not make her webs, or
the bee her honey, or the turtle-dove her nest,—what else could
you have said? would not the same answer have been
ready—“She did it at that time when she chose: let there be
no questioning on this matter”? Nay, if it were concerning some
sculptor or painter who works in paintings or in sculptures by his
imitative art, whatever it may be (supposing that he exercises his art
without being subject to any authority), I imagine that such an answer
would meet the case of any one who wished to know why he did not
exercise his art sooner,—that, being under no necessity, he made
his own choice the occasion of his operation. For men, because they do
not always wish the same things Reading ταὐτὰ for ταῦτα, which
appears in the text of Oehler as well as in the earlier
editions., and commonly have
not power co-operating with their will, do something which seems good
to them at that time when their choice inclines to the work, and they
have no external hindrance. But that nature which is always the same,
to which no good is adventitious, in which all that variety of plans
which arises by way of opposition, from error or from ignorance, has no
place, to which there comes nothing as a result of change, which was
not with it before, and by which nothing is chosen afterwards which it
had not from the beginning regarded as good,—to say of this
nature that it does not always possess what is good, but afterwards
chooses to have something which it did not choose before,—this
belongs to wisdom that surpasses us. For we were taught that the
Divine. Nature is at all times full of all good, or rather is itself
the fulness of all goods, seeing that it needs no addition for its
perfecting, but is itself by its own nature the perfection of good. Now
that which is perfect is equally remote from addition and from
diminution; and therefore, we say that perfection of goods which we
behold in the Divine Nature always remains the same, as, in whatsoever
direction we extend our thoughts, we there apprehend it to be such as
it is. The Divine Nature, then, is never void of good: but the Son is
the fulness of all good: and accordingly He is at all times
contemplated in that Father Whose Nature is perfection in all good. But
he says, “let there be no questioning about this point, why He
did not do so before:” and we shall answer him,—“It
is one thing, most sapient sir, to lay down as an ordinance some
proposition that you happen to approve Reading τι
τῶν κατὰ
γνωμὴν,
for τι τῶν
καταγνωμῶν, which is the reading of the editions, but introduces a
word otherwise apparently unknown., and
another to make converts by reasoning on the points of controversy. So
long, therefore, as you cannot assign any reason why we may piously say
that the Son was “afterwards” begotten by the Father, your
ordinances will be of no effect with sensible men.”