These things may help us to understand why that spiritual and divine sense, by which
those who are truly virtuous and holy perceive the excellency of true virtue, is in the sacred
Scriptures called by the name of light, knowledge, understanding, &c. If this divine sense
were a thing arbitrarily given, without any foundation in the nature of things, it would not
properly be called by such names. For if there were no correspondence, or agreement, in
such a sense with the nature of things, any more than there would have been in a contrary
sense, the idea we obtain by this spiritual sense could in no respect be said to be a knowledge
or perception of any thing besides what was in our own minds. For this idea would be no
representation of any thing without. But since it is agreeable, in the respects above mentioned,
to the nature of things; and especially since it is the representation of the moral perfection
and excellency of the Divine Being; hereby we have a perception of that moral excellency,
of which we could have no true idea without it. And hereby persons have that true knowledge
of God, which greatly enlightens the mind in the knowledge of divine things in general, and
which, as might be shown, if it were necessary to the main purpose of this discourse, in
many respects, assists persons to a right understanding of things in general; viz. to see the
nature and truth of them, in their proper evidence. Whereas, the want of this spiritual sense,
and the prevalence of those dispositions which are contrary to it, tends to darken and distract
the mind, and dreadfully to delude and confound men’s understandings.
Nor can that moral sense, common to mankind, which there is in natural conscience,
be truly said to be no more than a sentiment arbitrarily given by the Creator, without any
relation to the necessary nature of things: but rather, this is established in agreement with
the nature of things; so established, as no sense of mind that can be supposed of a contrary
nature and tendency could be. This will appear by these two things:
1. This moral sense—if the understanding be well informed, exercised at liberty, and in
an extensive manner, without being restrained to a private sphere—approves the very same
things which a spiritual and divine sense approves; and those things only; though not on
the same grounds, nor with the same kind of approbation. Therefore, as that divine sense is
agreeable to the necessary nature of things, as already shown; so this inferior moral sense,
being so far correspondent to that, must also so far agree with the nature of things.
2. It has been shown, that this moral sense consists in approving the uniformity and
natural agreement there is between one thing and another. So that, by the supposition, it is
agreeable to the nature of things. For therein it consists, viz. a disposition of mind to consent
to, or like, the agreement of the nature of things, or the agreement of the nature and form
of one thing with another. And certainly, such a temper of mind is more agreeable to the
nature of things than an opposite temper.
The use of language is to express our sentiments, or ideas, to each other; so that those
terms by which things of a moral nature are signified, express those moral sentiments which
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CHAPTER VIII. Whether virtue be founded in sentiment.