But I do not think that we need
linger on this, nor minutely examine that which follows. To the more
attentive reader, the argument elaborated by our opponent will itself
appear in the light of a special pleader on the side of orthodoxy. He
says, for instance, that imperishability and immortality are the very
essence of the Deity. For my part I see no need to contend with him, no
matter whether these qualities aforesaid only accrue to the
Deity, or whether they are, by virtue of their signification, His
essence; whichever of these two views is adopted, it will completely
support our argument. For if the being imperishable only accrues to the
essence, the not being generated will also most certainly only accrue
to it; and so the idea of ungeneracy will be ejected from being the
mark of the essence. If, on the other hand, because God is not subject
to destruction, one affirms imperishability to be His essence, and,
because He is stronger than death, one therefore defines immortality to
be His very essence, and if the Son is imperishable and immortal (as He
is), imperishability and immortality will also be the essence of the
Only-begotten. If, then, the Father is imperishability, and the Son
imperishability, and each of these imperishabilities is the essence,
and no difference exists between them as regards the idea of
imperishability, one essence will differ from the other essence in no
way at all, seeing that in both equally the nature is a stranger to any
corruption. Even if he should resume the same method as before, and
place us on the horns of his dilemma from which, as he thinks, there is
no escape, saying that, if we distinguish that which accrues from that
which is, we make the Deity composite, whereas if we acknowledge His
simplicity, then the imperishability and the ungeneracy are seen at
once to be significative of His very essence—even then again we
can show that he is fighting for our side. For if he will have it that
God is made composite by our saying that anything accrues to Him, then
he certainly cannot eject the Fatherhood either from the essence, but
must confess that He is Father by His nature as much as He is
imperishable and immortal; and so without intending it he must admit
the Son also to partake of that intimate nature; for it will not be
possible, if God is essentially Father, to exclude the Son from a
relationship to Him thus essential. But if he says that the Fatherhood
accrues to God, but is outside the circle of the substance, then he
must concede to us that we may say anything we like accrues to the
Deity, since the Divine simplicity is in no way marred, if His quality
of ungeneracy is made to mean something outside the essence. If,
however, he declares that the imperishability and the ungeneracy do
mean the essence, and if he insists that these two words are
equivalent, since, by reason of the same meaning lying in each, there
is no difference between them, and if he thus assert that the very idea
of imperishability and ungeneracy is one and the same, the One who is
the first of these must necessarily be the second too. But that the Son
is imperishable, let us observe, even these men entertain no doubt;
therefore, by Eunomius’ argument, the Son also is ungenerate, if
imperishability and ungeneracy are to mean the same thing. So that he
must accept one of two alternatives; either he must agree with us that
ungeneracy is other than imperishability, or, if he abides by his
assertions, he must in various ways speak blasphemy about the
Only-begotten, making Him, for instance, perishable, in order that he
may not have to say that He is ungenerate; or ungenerate, in order that
he may not prove Him perishable.