Chapter 3.—Which of the Three Leading Opinions Regarding the Chief Good Should
Be Preferred, According to Varro, Who Follows Antiochus and the Old Academy.
Which of these three is true and to be adopted he attempts to show in the following
manner. As it is the supreme good, not of a tree, or of a beast, or of a god, but of man that
philosophy is in quest of, he thinks that, first of all, we must define man. He is of opinion
that there are two parts in human nature, body and soul, and makes no doubt that of these
two the soul is the better and by far the more worthy part. But whether the soul alone is the
man, so that the body holds the same relation to it as a horse to the horseman, this he thinks
has to be ascertained. The horseman is not a horse and a man, but only a man, yet he is
called a horseman, because he is in some relation to the horse. Again, is the body alone the
man, having a relation to the soul such as the cup has to the drink? For it is not the cup and
the drink it contains which are called the cup, but the cup alone; yet it is so called because
it is made to hold the drink. Or, lastly, is it neither the soul alone nor the body alone, but
both together, which are man, the body and the soul being each a part, but the whole man
being both together, as we call two horses yoked together a pair, of which pair the near and
the off horse is each a part, but we do not call either of them, no matter how connected with
the other, a pair, but only both together? Of these three alternatives, then, Varro chooses
the third, that man is neither the body alone, nor the soul alone, but both together. And
therefore the highest good, in which lies the happiness of man, is composed of goods of
both kinds, both bodily and spiritual. And consequently he thinks that the primary objects
of nature are to be sought for their own sake, and that virtue, which is the art of living, and
can be communicated by instruction, is the most excellent of spiritual goods. This virtue,
then, or art of regulating life, when it has received these primary objects of nature which
existed independently of it, and prior to any instruction, seeks them all, and itself also, for
its own sake; and it uses them, as it also uses itself, that from them all it may derive profit
and enjoyment, greater or less, according as they are themselves greater or less; and while
it takes pleasure in all of them, it despises the less that it may obtain or retain the greater
when occasion demands. Now, of all goods, spiritual or bodily, there is none at all to compare
with virtue. For virtue makes a good use both of itself and of all other goods in which lies
man’s happiness; and where it is absent, no matter how many good things a man has, they
are not for his good, and consequently should not be called good things while they belong
to one who makes them useless by using them badly. The life of man, then, is called happy
when it enjoys virtue and these other spiritual and bodily good things without which virtue
is impossible. It is called happier if it enjoys some or many other good things which are not
essential to virtue; and happiest of all, if it lacks not one of the good things which pertain
to the body and the soul. For life is not the same thing as virtue, since not every life, but a
wisely regulated life, is virtue; and yet, while there can be life of some kind without virtue,
there cannot be virtue without life. This I might apply to memory and reason, and such
Which of the Three Leading Opinions Regarding the Chief Good Should Be Preferred, According to Varro, Who Follows Antiochus and the Old Academy.
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Which of the Three Leading Opinions Regarding the Chief Good Should Be Preferred,…