word consists in a living state; for it is an impiety to suppose that the Word has a soulless
subsistence after the manner of stones. But if it subsists, being as it is something with intellect
and without body, then certainly it lives, whereas if it be divorced from life, then as certainly
it does not subsist; but this idea that the Word of God does not subsist, has been shown to
be blasphemy. By consequence, therefore, it has also been shown that the Word is to be
considered as in a living condition. And since the nature of the Logos is reasonably believed
to be simple, and exhibits in itself no duplicity or combination, no one would contemplate
the existence of the living Logos as dependent on a mere participation of life, for such a
supposition, which is to say that one thing is within another, would not exclude the idea of
compositeness; but, since the simplicity has been admitted, we are compelled to think that
the Logos has an independent life, and not a mere participation of life. If, then, the Logos,
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as being life, lives1944, it certainly has the faculty of will, for no one of living creatures is
without such a faculty. Moreover that such a will has also capacity to act must be the con-
clusion of a devout mind. For if you admit not this potency, you prove the reverse to exist.
which would have destroyed the unity of the Godhead: “therefore, he (Plato) styled them Hypostases or Subsist-
encies, which is something between substance and quality, inexisting in the one, and serving as a receptacle for
the other’s inexistency within it.” But he adds, “I do not recommend this explanation to anybody”; nor does he
state the authority for this Platonic use, so lucidly explained, of the word. Indeed, if the word had ever been applied
to the principles of the Platonic triad, to express in the case of each of them “the distinct subsistence in a common
οὐσία,” it would have falsified the very conception of the first, i.e. Goodness, which was never relative. So that
this very word seems to emphasize, so far, the antagonism between Christianity and Platonism. Socrates (E. H.
iii. 7) bears witness to the absence of the word from the ancient Greek philosophy: “it appears to us that the
Greek philosophers have given us various definitions of οὐσία, but have not taken the slightest notice of
ὑπόστασις.…it is not found in any of the ancients except occasionally in a sense quite different from that which
is attached to it at the present day (i.e. fifth century). Thus Sophocles in his tragedy entitled Phœnix uses it to
signify ‘treachery’; in Menander it implies ‘sauces’ (i e. sediment). But although the ancient philosophical writers
scarcely noticed the word, the more modern ones have frequently used it instead of οὐσία.” But it was, as far as
can be traced, the unerring genius of Origen that first threw around the Λόγος that atmosphere of a new term,
i.e. ὑπόστασις, as well as ὁμοούσιος, αὐτόθεος, which afterward made it possible to present the Second Person
to the Greek-speaking world as the member of an equal and indivisible Trinity. It was he who first selected such
words and saw what they were capable of; though he did not insist on that fuller meaning which was put upon
them when all danger within the Church of Sabellianism had disappeared, and error passed in the guise of
Arianism to the opposite extreme.
1944 lives. This doctrine is far removed from that of Philo, i.e. from the Alexandrine philosophy. The very
first statement of S. John represents the Λόγος as having a backward movement towards the Deity, as well as a
forward movement from Him; as held there, and yet sent thence by a force which he calls Love, so that the
primal movement towards the world does not come from the Λόγος, but from the Father Himself. The Λόγος
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Chapter I