others’ esteem, and disapprove their contempt of them. And the case is the same with respect
to any being’s own qualities or attributes. If he highly esteems them, and greatly delights in
them, he will naturally and necessarily love to see esteem of them in others, and dislike their
disesteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly esteemed by the being who hath
them, so is the esteem of them in others worthy to be proportionately approved and regarded.
I desire it may he considered, whether it be unfit that God should be displeased with contempt
of himself? If not, but on the contrary it be fit and suitable that he should be displeased with
this, there is the same reason that he should be pleased with the proper love, esteem, and
honor of himself.
The matter may be also cleared, by considering what it would become us to approve of
and value with respect to any public society we belong to, e. g. our nation or country. It be-
comes us to love our country; and therefore it becomes us to value the just honor of our
country. But the same that it becomes us to value and desire for a friend, and the same that
it becomes us to desire and seek for the community, the same does it become God to value
and seek for himself; that is, on supposition, that it becomes God to love himself as it does
men to love a friend or the public; which I think has been before proved.
Here are two things that ought particularly to be adverted to. (1.) That in God, the love
of himself and the love of the public are not to be distinguished, as in man: because God’s
being, as it were, comprehends all. His existence, being infinite, must be equivalent to uni-
versal existence. And for the same reason that public affection in the creature is fit and
beautiful, God’s regard to himself must be so likewise.—(2.) In God, the love of what is fit
and decent, cannot he a distinct thing from the love of himself; because the love of God is
that wherein all holiness primarily and chiefly consists, and God’s own holiness must
primarily consist in the love of himself. And if God’s holiness consists in love to himself,
then it will imply an approbation of the esteem and love of him in others. For a being that
loves himself, necessarily loves love to himself. If holiness in God consist chiefly in love to
himself, holiness in the creature must chiefly consist in love to him. And if God loves holiness
in himself, he must love it in the creature.
Virtue, by such of the late philosophers as seem to be in chief repute, is placed in public
affection, or general benevolence. And if the essence of virtue lies primarily in this, then the
love of virtue itself is virtuous no otherwise, than as it is implied in, or arises from, this
public affection, or extensive benevolence of mind. Because if a man truly loves the public,
he necessarily loves love to the public.
Now therefore, for the same reason, if universal benevolence in the highest sense, be
the same thing with benevolence to the Divine Being, who is in effect universal Being, it will
follow, that love to virtue itself is no otherwise virtuous, than as it is implied in, or arises
from, love to the Divine Being. Consequently, God’s own love to virtue is implied in love
to himself: and is virtuous no otherwise than as it arises from love to himself. So that God’s
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SECTION IV. Some objections considered.