“addition” on the part of our friend. It would seem, then, that we may hold the same language
in regard to righteousness, wisdom, power, goodness, and all such attributes of God. Let,
then, no word have a meaning peculiar to itself, but let one signification underlie every word
in a list, and one form of description serve for the definition of all. If you are asked to define
the word judge, answer with the interpretation of “ungeneracy”; if to define justice, be ready
with “the incorporeal” as your answer. If asked to define incorruptibility, say that it has the
same meaning as mercy or judgment. Thus let all God’s attributes be convertible terms,
there being no special signification to distinguish one from another. But if Eunomius thus
prescribes, why do the Scriptures vainly assign various names to the Divine nature, calling
God a Judge, righteous, powerful, long-suffering, true, merciful and so on? For if none of
these titles is to be understood in any special or peculiar sense, but, owing to this confusion
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in their meaning, they are all mixed up together, it would be useless to employ so many
words for the same thing, there being no difference of meaning to distinguish them from
one another. But who is so much out of his wits as not to know that, while the Divine nature,
whatever it is in its essence, is simple, uniform, and incomposite, and that it cannot be
viewed under any form of complex formation, the human mind, grovelling on earth, and
buried in this life on earth, in its inability to behold clearly the object of its search, feels after
the unutterable Being in divers and many-sided ways, and never chases the mystery in the
light of one idea alone. Our grasping of Him would indeed be easy, if there lay before us
one single assigned path to the knowledge of God: but as it is, from the skill apparent in the
Universe, we get the idea of skill in the Ruler of that Universe, from the large scale of the
wonders worked we get the impression of His Power; and from our belief that this Universe
depends on Him, we get an indication that there is no cause whatever of His existence; and
again, when we see the execrable character of evil, we grasp His own unalterable pureness
as regards this: when we consider death’s dissolution to be the worst of ills, we give the name
of Immortal and Indissoluble at once to Him Who is removed from every conception of
that kind: not that we split up the subject of such attributes along with them, but believing
that this thing we think of, whatever it be in substance, is One, we still conceive that it has
something in common with all these ideas. For these terms are not set against each other
in the way of opposites, as if, the one existing there, the other could not co-exist in the same
subject (as, for instance, it is impossible that life and death should be thought of in the same
subject); but the force of each of the terms used in connection with the Divine Being is such
that, even though it has a peculiar significance of its own, it implies no opposition to the
term associated with it. What opposition, for instance, is there between “incorporeal” and
“just,” even though the words do not coincide in meaning: and what hostility is there between
goodness and invisibility? So, too, the eternity of the Divine Life, though represented under
the double name and idea of “the unending” and “the unbeginning,” is not cut in two by
this difference of name; nor yet is the one name the same in meaning as the other; the one
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.