he comes to close quarters with what remains, and having severed the connection of the
living whole201, and thus made it, as he thinks, a more yielding and assailable victim of his
logic, he misleads his own party with the frigid and feeble paralogism, that “that which has
a common meaning, in one single point, with something else retains that community of
meaning in every possible point;” and with this he takes their shallow intelligences by storm.
For while we have only affirmed that the word Father in a certain signification yields the
same meaning as Ungenerate, this man makes the coincidence of meanings complete in
every point, quite at variance therein with the common acceptation of either word; and so
he reduces the matter to an absurdity, pretending that this word Father can no longer denote
any relation to the Son, if the idea of not having been generated is conveyed by it. It is just
as if some one, after having acquired two ideas about a loaf,—one, that it is made of flour,
the other, that it is food to the consumer—were to contend with the person who told him
this, using against him the same kind of fallacy as Eunomius does, viz., that ‘the being made
of flour is one thing, but the being food is another; if, then, it is granted that the loaf is made
of flour, this quality in it can no longer strictly be called food.’ Such is the thought in Euno-
mius’ syllogism; “if the not having been generated is implied by the word Father, this word
can no longer convey the idea of having generated the Son.” But I think it is time that we,
in our turn, applied to this argument of his that magnificently rounded period of his own
(already quoted). In reply to such words, it would be suitable to say that he would have more
claim to be considered in his sober senses, if he had put the limit to such argumentative
safeguards at absolute silence. For “where additional words amount to additional blasphemy,”
or, rather, indicate that he has utterly lost his reason, it is not only “by half as much more,”
but by the whole as much more “tranquillizing to be silent than to speak.”
88
But perhaps a man would be more easily led into the true view by personal illustrations;
so let us leave this looking backwards and forwards and this twisting of false premisses202,
and discuss the matter in a less learned and more popular way. Your father, Eunomius, was
certainly a human being; but the same person was also the author of your being. Did you,
then, ever use in his case too this clever quibble which you have employed; so that your own
‘father,’ when once he receives the true definition of his being, can no longer mean, because
of being a ‘man,’ any relationship to yourself; ‘for he must be one of two things, either a
201 “the living whole.” σώματος: this is the radical meaning of σῶμα, and also the classical. Viger. (Idiom. p.
143 note) distinguishes four meanings under this. 1. Safety. 2. Individuality. 3. Living presence. 4. Life: and adduces
instances of each from the Attic orators.
202 τὸ κατηγκυλωμένον τῆς τῶν συφισμάτων πλοκῆς. See c. 38, note 7. The false premisses in the syllogisms
have been— 1. Father (partly) means ᾽Αγέννητος Things which mean the same in part, mean the same in all
(false premiss). Father means ᾽Αγέννητος (false). 2. Father means ᾽Αγέννητος (false). ᾽Αγέννητος does not
mean ‘having a Son.’ Father does not mean ‘having a Son’ (false).
168
Several ways of controverting his quibbling syllogisms.