but how to drag and force them into keeping with his phrases, and going round and collecting
out of certain books the words in them that sound grandest. And as beggars in lack of
clothing pin and tack together tunics for themselves out of rags, so he, cropping here a
phrase and there a phrase, has woven together for himself the patchwork of his treatise,
glueing in and fixing together the joinings of his diction with much labour and pains, dis-
playing therein a petty and juvenile ambition for combat, which any man who has an eye
to actuality would disdain, just as a steadfast wrestler, no longer in the prime of life, would
disdain to play the woman by over-niceness in dress. But to me it seems that, when the scope
of the whole question has been briefly run through, his roundabout flourishes may well be
let alone.
I have said, then (for I make my master’s words my own), that reason supplies us with
but a dim and imperfect comprehension of the Divine nature; nevertheless, the knowledge
that we gather from the terms which piety allows us to apply to it is sufficient for our limited
capacity. Now we do not say that all these terms have a uniform significance; for some of
them express qualities inherent in God, and others qualities that are not, as when we say
that He is just or incorruptible, by the term “just” signifying that justice is found in Him,
and by “incorruptible” that corruption is not. Again, by a change of meaning, we may apply
terms to God in the way of accommodation, so that what is proper to God may be represented
by a term which in no wise belongs to Him, and what is foreign to His nature may be rep-
resented by what belongs to Him. For whereas justice is the contradictory of injustice, and
everlastingness the contrary of destruction, we may fitly and without impropriety employ
contraries in speaking of God, as when we say that He is ever existent, or that He is not
unjust, which is equivalent to saying that He is just, and that He admits not of corruption.
So, too, we may say that other names of God, by a certain change of signification, may be
suitably employed to express either meaning, for example “good,” and “immortal,” and all
expressions of like formation; for each of these terms, according as it is taken, is capable of
indicating what does or what does not appertain to the Divine nature, so that, notwithstand-
ing the formal change, our orthodox opinion in regard to the object remains immovably
fixed. For it amounts to the same, whether we speak of God as unsusceptible of evil, or
whether we call Him good; whether we confess that He is immortal, or say that He ever
liveth. For we understand no difference in the sense of these terms, but we signify one and
the same thing by both, though the one may seem to convey the notion of affirmation, and
the other of negation. And so again, when we speak of God as the First Cause of all things,
or again, when we speak of Him as without cause, we are guilty of no contradiction in sense,
declaring as we do by either name that God is the prime Ruler and First Cause of all. Accord-
ingly when we speak of Him as without cause, and as Lord of all, in the former case we sig-
nify what does not attach to Him, in the latter case what does; it being possible, as I have
said, by a change of the things signified, to give an opposite sense to the words that express
499
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.