Chapter XLII.—Sleep, the
Mirror of Death, as Introductory to the Consideration of
Death.
It now remains (that we discuss the subject) of
death, in order that our subject-matter may terminate where the soul
itself completes it; although Epicurus, indeed, in his pretty widely
known doctrine, has asserted that death does not appertain to us. That,
says he, which is dissolved lacks sensation; and that which is without
sensation is nothing to us. Well, but it is not actually death which
suffers dissolution and lacks sensation, but the human person who
experiences death. Yet even
he
has admitted suffering to be
incidental to the being to whom action belongs. Now, if it is in man to
suffer death, which dissolves the body and destroys the senses, how
absurd to say that so great a susceptibility belongs not to man! With
much greater precision does Seneca say: “After death all comes to
an end, even (death) itself.” From which position of his it must
needs follow that death will appertain to its own self, since itself
comes to an end; and much more to man, in the ending of whom amongst
the “
all
,” itself also ends. Death, (says Epicurus)
belongs not to us; then at that rate, life belongs not to us. For
certainly, if that which causes our dissolution have no relation to us,
that also which compacts and composes us must be unconnected with us.
If the deprivation of our sensation be nothing to us, neither can the
acquisition of sensation have anything to do with us. The fact,
however, is, he who destroys the very soul, (as Epicurus does), cannot
help destroying death also. As for ourselves, indeed, (Christians as we
are), we must treat of death just as we should of the posthumous life
and of some other province of the soul, (assuming) that we at all
events belong to death, if it does not pertain to us. And on the same
principle, even
sleep
, which is the very mirror of death, is not
alien from our subject-matter.