sence,” he tells us, “and the appellation of ‘Son,’ makes such a relation of words appropriate.”
149
If, then, he confesses that such a relation of words is made appropriate by the fact that the
Son is really a “product of generation,” how is it opportune to assign such a rationale of
names, alike to those which are used inexactly by way of metaphor, and to those where the
natural relation, as Eunomius tells us, makes such a use of names appropriate? Surely such
an account is true only in the case of those whose nature is a border-land between virtue
and vice, where one often shares in turn opposite classes of names, becoming a child, now
of light, then again of darkness, by reason of affinity to the good or to its opposite. But where
contraries have no place, one could no longer say that the word “Son” is applied metaphor-
ically, in like manner as in the case of those who by choice appropriate the title to themselves.
For one could not arrive at this view, that, as a man casting off the works of darkness becomes,
by his decent life, a child of light, so too the Only-begotten God received the more honourable
name as the result of a change from the inferior state. For one who is a man becomes a son
of God by being joined to Christ by spiritual generation: but He Who by Himself makes the
man to be a son of God does not need another Son to bestow on Him the adoption of a son,
but has the name also of that which He is by nature. A man himself changes himself, exchan-
ging the old man for the new; but to what shall God be changed, so that He may receive
what He has not? A man puts off himself, and puts on the Divine nature; but what does He
put off, or in what does He array Himself, Who is always the same? A man becomes a son
of God, receiving what he has not, and laying aside what he has; but He Who has never been
in the state of vice has neither anything to receive nor anything to relinquish. Again, the
man may be on the one hand truly called some one’s son, when one speaks with reference
to his nature; and, on the other hand, he may be so called inexactly, when the choice of his
life imposes the name. But God, being One Good, in a single and uncompounded nature,
looks ever the same way, and is never changed by the impulse of choice, but always wishes
what He is, and is, assuredly, what He wishes: so that He is in both respects properly and
truly called Son of God, since His nature contains the good, and His choice also is never
severed from that which is more excellent, so that this word is employed, without inexactness,
as His name. Thus there is no room for these arguments (which, in the person of our ad-
versaries, we have been opposing to ourselves), to be brought forward by our adversaries
as a demurrer to the affinity in respect of nature.
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Thereafter he expounds the appellation of “Son,” and of “product of generation,”…