mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it does so or no; it is induced to it, for the sake
of making some experiment, or by the desire of a friend, or some other motive that prevails.
So it is in the second step, the mind determining to give itself up to accident, by touching
that which shall be most in the eye, or the idea of which shall be most prevalent in the mind,
&c. The mind is not absolutely indifferent whether it proceeds by this rule or no; but chooses
it, because it appears at that time a convenient and requisite expedient in order to fulfil the
general purpose. And so it is in the third and last step, which is determining to touch that
individual spot which actually does prevail in the mind’s view. The mind is not indifferent
concerning this; but is influenced by a prevailing inducement and reason; which is, that this
is a prosecution of the preceding determination, which appeared requisite, and was fixed
before in the second step.
Accident will ever serve a man, without hindering him a moment, in such a case. Among
a number of objects in view, one will prevail in the eye, or in idea, beyond others. When we
have our eyes open in the clear sunshine, many objects strike the eye at once, and innumerable
images may be at once painted in it by the rays of light; but the attention of the mind is not
equal to several of them at once; or if it be, it does not continue so for any time. And so it
is with respect to the ideas of the mind in general: several ideas are not in equal strength in
the mind’s view and notice at once; or at least, does not remain so for any sensible continu-
ance. There is nothing in the world more constantly varying, than the ideas of the mind;
they do not remain precisely in the same state for the least perceivable space of time; as is
evident by this:—That all time is perceived by the mind, only by the successive changes of
its own ideas. Therefore while the perceptions of the mind remain precisely in the same
state, there is no perceivable length of time, because no sensible succession at all.
As the acts of the Will, in each step of the forementioned procedure, do not come to
pass without a particular cause, but every act is owing to a prevailing inducement; so the
accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in the unsearchable course of things, to
which the mind yields itself, and by which it is guided, is not any thing that comes to pass
without a cause. The mind in determining to be guided by it, is not determined by something
that has no cause; any more than if it be determined to be guided by a lot, or the casting of
a die. For though the die falling in such a manner be accidental to him that casts it, yet none
will suppose that there is no cause why it falls as it does. The involuntary changes in the
succession of our ideas, though the cause may not be observed, have as much a cause, as the
changeable motions of the motes that float in the air, or the continual, infinitely various,
successive changes of the unevennesses on the surface of the water.
There are two things especially, which are probably the occasions of confusion in the
minds of them who insist upon it, that the Will acts in a proper indifference, and without
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SECTION VI. Concerning the Will determining in things which are perfectly…