but as to all things that begin to be, they are not self-existent, and therefore must have some
foundation of their existence without themselves.—That whatsoever begins to be, which
before was not, must have a Cause why it then begins to exist, seems to be the first dictate
of the common and natural sense which God hath implanted in the minds of all mankind,
and the main foundation of all our reasonings about the existence of things, past, present,
or to come.
And this dictate of common sense equally respects substances and modes, or things and
the manner and circumstances of things. Thus, if we see a body which has hitherto been at
rest, start out of a state of rest, and begin to move, we do as naturally and necessarily suppose
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there is some Cause or reason of this new mode of existence, as of the existence of a body
itself which had hitherto not existed. And so if a body, which had hitherto moved in a certain
direction, should suddenly change the direction of its motion; or if it should put off its old
figure, and take a new one; or change its color: the beginning of these new modes is a new
Event, and the human mind necessarily supposes that there is some Cause or reason of
them.
If this grand principle of common sense be taken away, all arguing from effects to causes
ceaseth, and so all knowledge of any existence, besides what we have by the most direct and
immediate intuition, particularly all our proof of the being of God, ceases: we argue His
being from our own being, and the being of other things, which we are sensible once were
not, but have begun to be; and from the being of the world, with all its constituent parts,
and the manner of their existence; all which we see plainly are not necessary in their own
nature, and so not self-existent, and therefore must have a Cause. But if things, not in
themselves necessary, may begin to be without a Cause, all this arguing is vain.
Indeed, I will not affirm, that there is in the nature of things no foundation for the
knowledge of the Being of God, without any evidence of it from his works. I do suppose
there is a great absurdity in denying Being in general, and imagining an eternal, absolute,
universal nothing: and therefore that there would be, in the nature of things, a foundation
of intuitive evidence, that there must be an eternal, infinite, most perfect Being; if we had
strength and comprehension of mind sufficient, to have a clear idea of general and universal
Being. But then we should not properly come to the knowledge of the Being of God by ar-
guing; our evidence would be intuitive: we should see it, as we see other things that are ne-
cessary in themselves, the contraries of which are in their own nature absurd and contradict-
ory; as we see that twice two is four; and as we see that a circle has no angles. If we had as
clear an idea of universal, infinite entity, as we have of these other things, I suppose we
should most intuitively see the absurdity of supposing such Being not to be; should imme-
diately see there is no room for the question, whether it is possible that Being, in the most
general, abstracted notion of it should not be. But we have not that strength and extent of
mind, to know this certainly in this intuitive, independent manner: but the way that mankind
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SECTION III. Whether any Event whatsoever, and Volition in particular,…