most searching inquiry into the matter. And some of them expressed the same opinion as
you did, but others again represented God as the creator of these things, fearing to allow
the existence of substance as coeval with Him; while the former, from fear of saying that
God was the author of evil, thought fit to represent matter as coeval with Him.2836 And it
was the fate of both of these to fail to speak rightly on the subject, in consequence of their
fear of God not being in agreement with an accurate knowledge of the truth.
But others declined to inquire about such a question at all, on the ground that such an
inquiry is endless. As for me, however, my connection with you in friendship does not allow
me to decline the subject of inquiry, especially when you announce your own purpose, that
you are not swayed by prejudice,—although you had your opinion about the condition of
things derived from your conjectures,—but say that you are confirmed in a desire of
knowing the truth.
Wherefore I will willingly turn to the discussion of the question. But I wish this compan-
ion of mine here to listen to our conversation.2837 For, indeed, he seems to have much the
same opinions about these things as you have, wherefore I wish that you should both have
a share in the discussion. For whatever I should say to you, situated as you are, I shall say
just as much to him. If, then, you are indulgent enough to think I speak truly on this great
subject, give an answer to each question I ask; for the result of this will be that you will gain
a knowledge of the truth, and I shall not carry on my discussion with you at random.
Valentinian. I am ready to do as you say; and therefore be quite ready to ask those
questions from which you think I may be able to gain an accurate knowledge of this important
subject. For the object which I have set before myself is not the base one of gaining a victory,
but that of becoming thoroughly acquainted with the truth. Wherefore apply yourself to
the rest of the discussion.
Orthodoxus. Well, then, I do not suppose you are ignorant that it is impossible for two
uncreated things to exist together, although you seem to have expressed nearly as much as
this in an earlier part of the conversation. Assuredly we must of necessity say one of two
things: either that God is separate from matter, or, on the other hand, that He is inseparable
from it. If, then, one would say that they are united, he will say that that which is uncreated
is one only, for each of the things spoken of will be a part of the other; and as they are parts
of each other, there will not be two uncreated things, but one composed of different elements.
(refuting Bayle), no need to speak here. Comp. Addison, Spectator, Nos. 237 and 519; also Parnell’s Hermit; also
Jer. xii. 1.]
2836 The reader will here naturally think of the great and long-continued Manichæan controversy.—Tr.
2837 [See Routh, R. S., tom. ii. p. 98, and note p. 115, and all Routh’s notes on Maximus, the original of
Methodius, of whom see Eusebius, H. E., book v. cap. 27.]
814
Concerning Free-Will.