if there be any other way: because, as was said before, it is absurd to say, that a proposition
is known to be certainly and infallibly true, which yet may possibly prove not true.
The whole of the seeming force of this evasion lies in this; that, inasmuch as certain
Foreknowledge does not cause an event to be necessary, as a decree does; therefore it does
not prove it to be necessary, as a decree does. But there is no force in this arguing: for it is
built wholly on this supposition, that nothing can prove or be an evidence of a thing being
necessary, but that which has a causal influence to make it so. But this can never be main-
tained. If certain Foreknowledge of the future existence of an event be not the thing which
first makes it impossible that it should fail of existence; yet it may, and certainly does
demonstrate, that it is impossible it should fail of it, however that impossibility comes. If
Foreknowledge be not the cause, but the effect of this impossibility, it may prove that there
is such an impossibility, as much as if it were the cause. It is as strong arguing from the effect
to the cause, as from the cause to the effect. It is enough, that an existence, which is infallibly
foreknown, cannot fail, whether that impossibility arises from the Foreknowledge, or is
prior to it. It is as evident as any thing can be, that it is impossible a thing, which is infallibly
known to be true, should prove not to be true; therefore there is a Necessity that it should
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be otherwise; whether the Knowledge be the cause of this Necessity, or the Necessity the
cause of the Knowledge.
All certain Knowledge, whether it be Foreknowledge or After-knowledge, or concomitant
Knowledge, proves the thing known now to he necessary, by some means or other; or proves
that it is impossible it should now be otherwise than true.—I freely allow, that Foreknowledge
does not prove a thing to be necessary any more than After-knowledge: but then After-
knowledge, which is certain and infallible, proves that it is now become impossible but that
the proposition known should be true. Certain After-knowledge proves that it is now, by
some means or other, become impossible but that the proposition, which predicates past
existence on the event, should be true. And so does certain Foreknowledge prove, that now,
in the time of the Knowledge, it is, by some means or other, become impossible but that the
proposition, which predicates future existence on the event, should be true. The necessity
of the truth of the propositions, consisting in the present impossibility of the non-existence
of the event affirmed, in both cases, is the immediate ground of the certainty of the Know-
ledge; there can be no certainty of Knowledge without it.
There must he a certainty in things themselves, before they are certainly known, or
which is the same thing, known to be certain. For certainty of Knowledge is nothing else
but knowing or discerning the certainty there is in the things themselves, which are known.
Therefore there must be a certainty in things to be a ground of certainty of Knowledge, and
to render things capable of being known to be certain. And there is nothing but the necessity
of truth known, or its being impossible but that it should be true; or, in other words, the
firm and infallible connexion between the subject and predicate of the proposition that
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SECTION XII. God's certain Foreknowledge of the future volitions of moral…