the sessions of the Council. Indeed when we realize how imperfect and incorrect a conception
of Arianism he had before the Council began, and how clearly its true bearing was there
brought out by its enemies, we can see that he could not do otherwise than change; that he
must have become either an out-and-out Arian, or an opponent of Arianism as he did.
When he learned, and learned for the first time, that Arianism meant the denial of all essential
divinity to Christ, and when he saw that it involved the ascription of mutability and of other
finite attributes to him, he must either change entirely his views on those points or he must
leave the Arian party. To him who with all his subordinationism had laid in all his writings
so much stress on the divinity of the Word (even though he had not realized exactly what
that divinity involved) it would have been a revolution in his Christian life and faith to have
admitted what he now learned that Arianism involved. Sabellianism had been his dread,
but now this new fear, which had aroused so large a portion of the Church, seized him too,
and he felt that stand must be made against this too great separation of Father and Son,
which was leading to dangerous results. Under the pressure of this fear it is not surprising
that he should become convinced that the Arian formula—“there was a time when the Son
was not”—involved serious consequences, and that Alexander and his followers should have
succeeded in pointing out to him its untruth, because it led necessarily to a false conclusion.
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It is not surprising, moreover, that they should have succeeded in explaining to him at least
partially their belief, which, as his epistle to Alexander shows, had before been absolutely
incomprehensible, that the Son was generated from all eternity, and that therefore the
Father did not exist before him in a temporal sense.
He says toward the close of his epistle to the Cæsarean church that he had not been ac-
customed to use such expressions as “There was a time when he was not,” “He came to be
from nothing,” etc. And there is no reason to doubt that he speaks the truth. Even in his
epistles to Alexander and Euphration he does not use those phrases (though he does defend
the doctrine taught by the first of them), nor does Arius himself, in the epistle to Alexander
upon which Eusebius apparently based his knowledge of the system, use those expressions,
although he too teaches the same doctrine. The fact is that in that epistle Arius studiously
avoids such favorite Arian phrases as might emphasize the differences between himself and
Alexander, and Eusebius seems to have avoided them for the same reason. We conclude
then that Eusebius was not an Arian (nor an adherent of Lucian) before 318, that soon after
that date he became an Arian in the sense in which he understood Arianism, but that during
the Council of Nicæa he ceased to be one in any sense. His writings in later years confirm
the course of doctrinal development which we have supposed went on in his mind. He
never again defends Arian doctrines in his works, and yet he never becomes an Athanasian
in his emphasis upon the ὁμοούσιον. In fact he represents a mild orthodoxy, which is always
orthodox—when measured by the Nicene creed as interpreted by the Nicene Council—and
yet is always mild. Moreover, he never acquired an affection for the word ὁμοούσιος, which
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The Outbreak of the Arian Controversy. The Attitude of Eusebius.