to another volition; both these supposed volitions are in effect the very same. A volition to
yield to the force of a Motive inviting to choose something, comes to just the same thing as
choosing the thing which the Motive invites to, as I observed before. So that here can be no
room to help the matter, by a distinction of two volitions. (2.) If the Motive be passive, not
with respect to the same volition to which the Motive excites, but to one truly distinct and
prior; yet, by Mr. Chubb, that prior volition cannot take place without a Motive or excitement,
as a previous ground of its existence. For he insists, that “it is absurd to suppose any volition
should take place without some previous Motive to induce it,” So that at last it comes to just
the same absurdity: for if every volition must have a previous Motive, then the very first in
the whole series must be excited by a previous Motive; and yet the Motive to that first volition
is passive; but cannot be passive with regard to another antecedent volition, because, by the
supposition, it is the very first: therefore if it be passive with respect to any volition, it must
be so with regard to that very volition of which it is the ground, and that is excited by it.
III. Though Mr. Chubb asserts, as above, that every volition has some motive, and that
”in the nature of the thing, no volition can take place without some Motive to induce it;” yet
he asserts, that volition does not always follow the strongest Motive; or, in other words, is
not governed by any superior strength of the Motive that is followed, beyond Motives to
the contrary, previous to the volition itself. His own words (p. 258.) are as follow: “Though
with regard to physical causes, that which is strongest always prevails, yet it is otherwise
with regard to moral causes. Of these, sometimes the stronger, sometimes the weaker, prevails.
And the ground of this difference is evident, namely, that what we call moral causes, strictly
speaking, are no causes at all, but barely passive reasons of or excitements to the action, or
to the refraining from acting: which excitements we have power, or are at liberty, to comply
with or reject, as I have showed above.” And so throughout the paragraph, he in a variety
of phrases insists, that the Will is not always determined by the strongest Motive, unless by
strongest we preposterously mean actually prevailing in the event; which is not in the Motive,
but in the Will; but that the Will is not always determined by the Motive which is strongest,
by any strength previous to the volition itself. And he elsewhere abundantly asserts, that the
Will is determined by no superior strength or advantage, that Motives have, from any con-
stitution or state of things, or any circumstances whatsoever, previous to the actual determ-
ination of the Will. And indeed his whole discourse on human liberty implies it, his whole
scheme is founded upon it.
But these things cannot stand together. There is a diversity of strength in Motives to
choice, previous to the choice itself. Mr. Chubb himself supposes, that they do previously
invite, induce, excite, and dispose the mind to action. This implies, that they have something
in themselves that is inviting, some tendency to induce and dispose to volition previous to
volition itself. And if they have in themselves this nature and tendency, doubtless they have
it in certain limited degrees, which are capable of diversity; and some have it in greater de-
586
SECTION X. Volition necessarily connected with the influence of Motives;…