SECT. IV.
Some objections considered, which may be made against the reasonableness of what has
been said of God making himself his last end.
Object. I. Some may object against what has been said as being inconsistent with God’s
absolute independence and immutability: particularly, as though God were inclined to a
communication of his fulness, and emanations of his own glory, as being his own most
glorious and complete state. It may be thought that this does not well consist with God,
being self-existent from all eternity; absolutely perfect in himself, in the possession of infinite
and independent good. And that, in general, to suppose that God himself his end, in the
creation of the world, seems to suppose that he aims at some interest or happiness of his
own, not easily reconcilable with his being perfect and infinitely happy in himself. If it could
be supposed that God needed any thing; or that the goodness of his creatures could extend
to him; or that they could be profitable to him; it might be fit, that God should make himself,
and his own interest, his highest and last end in creating the world. But seeing that God is
above all need, and all capacity of being made better or happier in any respect; to what
purpose should God make himself his end, or seek to advance himself in any respect by any
of his works? How absurd is it to suppose that God should do such great things, with a view
to obtain what he is already most perfectly possessed of, and was so from all eternity; and
therefore cannot now possibly, need, nor with any colour of reason be supposed to seek!
Ans. 1. Many have wrong notions of God’s happiness, as resulting from his absolute
self-sufficience, independence, and immutability. Though it be true, that God’s glory and
happiness are in and of himself, are infinite and cannot be added to, and unchangeable, for
the whole and every part of which he is perfectly independent of the creature; yet it does
not hence follow, nor is it true, that God has no real and proper delight, pleasure, or happi-
ness, in any of his acts or communications relative to the creature, or effects he produces
in them; or in any thing he sees in the creature’s qualifications, dispositions, actions and
state.
God may have a real and proper pleasure or happiness in seeing the happy state of the
creature; yet this may not be different from his delight in himself; being a delight in his own
infinite goodness; or the exercise of that glorious propensity of his nature to diffuse and
communicate himself and so gratifying this inclination of his own heart. This delight which
God has in his creature’s happiness, cannot properly be said to be what God receives from
the creature. For it is only the effect of his own work in and communications to the creature;
in making it, and admitting it to a participation of his fulness. As the sun receives no thing
from the jewel that receives its light, and shines only, by a participation of its brightness.
With respect also to the creature’s holiness; God may have a proper delight and joy in
imparting this to the creature, as gratifying hereby his inclination to communicate of his
own excellent fulness. God may delight, with true and great pleasure, in beholding that
SECTION IV. Some objections considered.
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SECTION IV. Some objections considered.