or the sense in which that word is used. They find that all the senses in which the word has
been used, with respect to the mind and its acts, may be reduced to these two: 1. Either an
entire exemption from previous certainty, or the certain futurity of the acts which it will
perform: or, 2. Spontaneity.—Those, who use it in the former sense, cannot avoid the con-
sequence, that, in order to act freely, we must act by chance, which is absurd, and what no
man will dare to avow. If then liberty means an exemption from an influence, to which the
will is or can be opposed, every volition is free, whatever may be the manner of its coming
into existence. If, furthermore, God, by his grace, create in man a clean heart and holy voli-
tions, such volitions being, by the very signification of the term itself, voluntary, and in no
sense opposed to the divine influence which causes them, they are evidently as free as they
could have been, if they had come into existence by mere chance and without cause. We
have, of course no need of being the efficient causes of those acts, which our wills perform,
to render them either virtuous or vicious. As to the liberty, then, of self-determination or
contingence, it implies, as already observed, that actions, in order to be free, must have no
cause; but are brought into existence by chance. Thus have they illustrated the real and wide
difference between natural and moral necessity. They have proved that this difference con-
sists, not in the degree of previous certainty that an action will be performed—but in the fact,
that natural necessity admits an entire opposition of the will, while moral necessity implies,
and, in all cases, secures, the consent of the will. It follows that all necessity of the will, and
of its acts, is of the moral kind; and that natural necessity cannot possibly affect the will or
any of its exercises. It likewise follows, that if liberty, as applied to a moral agent, mean an
exemption from all previous certainty that an action will be performed, then no action of
man or any other creature can be free; for on this supposition, every action must come to
pass without divine prescience, by mere chance, and consequently without a cause.—Now,
therefore, the Calvinists find themselves placed upon firm and high ground. They fear not
the attacks of their opponents. They face them on the ground of reason, as well as of Scripture.
They act not merely on the defensive. Rather they have carried the war into Italy, and to the
very gates of Rome.—But all this is peculiar to America; except that a few European writers
have adopted, from American authors, the sentiments here stated. Even the famous Assembly
of Divines had very imperfect views of this subject. This they prove, when they say, “Our
first parents, being left to the freedom of their own will, fell from the state wherein they were
created;”—and “God foreordained whatsoever comes to pass, so as the contingencyof second
causes is not taken away, but rather established.”—These divines unquestionably meant,
that our first parents, in the instance, at least, of their fall, acted from self-determination,
and by mere contingence or chance. But there is no more reason to believe or even suppose
this, than there is to suppose it true of every sinner, in every sin which he commits.
“3. Mr. Edwards very happily illustrated and explained The nature of True Virtue, or
Holiness.—What is the nature of true virtue, or holiness?—In what does it consist?—and,
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CHAPTER XXV. Concluding remarks