differs from that which is implied in Mr. E’s notion of true virtue? Moreover, whether loving God with ALL our
heart is calculated to render “the particular affections, to every purpose of virtue, useless, and even pernicious?”
And, once more, whether that act of the mind which is compatible with a rejection of what the divine oracle
thus requires, can in any propriety of language, among Christians, be termed virtuous? 15. “To allege,” Mr. H.
observes, “that the general good is promoted by them will be no advantage to the defence of this system.” We
apprehend he means, that some may be disposed to allow, that the private affections, though not virtuous, may
yet promote the general good, on some other account. But the objector is under a mistake, if he suppose, as he
apparently does, that Mr. E. held any notion of true virtue which will admit no private or “particular affections”
to be virtuous. In fact, the system explained in this Dissertation excludes no particular affection: but fully admits
that any, yea, that all of them may be virtuous, by a proper direction. Supreme love to God, or attachment to
universal being, is virtue per se; but any other affection, however public or private, particular or general, is a
virtue only relatively; that is, only so far as it is a tendency to universal being. When the affection terminates on
any particular object, without any relation in its tendency to universal existence, it is not a mean of ultimate
happiness in itself commendable, and therefore is not virtuous. 16. “We have no dispute,” says Mr. H. “respecting
what is the ultimate end of virtue—the question is, What is virtue itself?” Very true; what is it? We say, a love,
an attachment, or a tendency of mind, to general or universal existence; whatever be the immediate object of
the will or affections. If the affection be, for instance, that of parent to a child, however strong in its operation,
it is no further truly virtuous, than there is a regard to God in it: or, a tendency to general being. But what is
virtue itself, according to Mr. H.? The answer is not given. Had Mr. H. thought proper to give us a definition
of virtue, we might compare notes, and form an estimate. It is much easier to find fault than to amend it; but
this we feel disposed to promise, that if the objector produce what he thinks a better definition than what he
opposes, we will endeavour too examine it with impartiality. 17. Mr. H. supposes that the author of the work
entitled “Political Justice” was “indebted to Mr. Edwards for his principal arguments against the private affections.”
Surely that author must possess a most perverse kind of ingenuity, who could deduce any thing from the works
of President Edwards against the private affections. Such ingenuity as an infidel some times employs, when he
is indebted to the writers of the Old or New Testament for his principal arguments against religion, and in favour
of infidelity. 18. “A mistaken pursuit of simplicity,” Mr. H. supposes, attaches to this system, whereby its advocates
“place virtue exclusively in some one disposition of mind.” We conceive, there is just as much propriety in this
remark, as in the following: A mistaken pursuit of simplicity led a certain writer to place conformity to law
“exclusively” in some one disposition of mind, where he says, that the law is fulfilled in one word, love. We are
not aware that it is a matter of doubt, whether moral acts, and consequently virtue, proceed from the will, or
the heart? and, as every exercise of will or affection is not virtuous, it requires no long “pursuit of simplicity” to
determine that the virtuous character of the affection must arise from its nature, rather than its degree; and from
its being directed to a worthy, rather than an unworthy object. 19. Mr. H. illustrates his meaning by two kinds
of attraction; and so does Mr. E. illustrate his. Private affections, or instincts, irrespective of their virtuous
quality, may be represented by the attraction of cohesion, whereby the several parts of individual bodies are
held in contact. A truly virtuous affection may be represented by the attraction of gravitation, which maintains
the union of bodies themselves with the general system. And, “though the union in the former case is much
more intimate, than in the latter,” and “each is equally essential to the order of the world:” yet, private affections,
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CHAPTER VII. The reasons of many mistakes