the same with God in respect of nature; and one may collect many such instances from the
inspired Scripture, by means of which deceit, like some image decked with the testimonies
of Scripture, masquerades in the likeness of truth.
Well, what do we say to this? The divine Scripture knows how to use the word “Son”
in both senses, so that in some cases such an appellation is derived from nature, in others
it is adventitious and artificial. For when it speaks of “sons of men,” or “sons of rams599,”
it marks the essential relation of that which is begotten to that from which it has its being:
but when it speaks of “sons of power,” or “children of God,” it presents to us that kinship
which is the result of choice. And, moreover, in the opposite sense, too, the same persons
are called “sons of Eli,” and “sons of Belial600,” the appellation of “sons” being easily adapted
to either idea. For when they are called “sons of Eli,” they are declared to have natural rela-
tionship to him, but in being called “sons of Belial,” they are reproved for the wickedness
of their choice, as no longer emulating their father in their life, but addicting their own
purpose to sin. In the case, then, of this lower nature of ours, and of the things with which
we are concerned, by reason of human nature being equally inclined to either side (I mean,
to vice and to virtue), it is in our power to become sons either of night or of day, while our
nature yet remains, so far as the chief part of it is concerned, within its proper limits. For
neither is he who by sin becomes a child of wrath alienated from his human generation, nor
does he who by choice addicts himself to good reject his human origin by the refinement
of his habits, but, while their nature in each case remains the same, the differences of their
purpose assume the names of their relationship, according as they become either children
of God by virtue, or of the opposite by vice.
But how does Eunomius, in the case of the divine doctrines at least—he who “preserves
the natural order” (for I will use our author’s very words), “and abides by those things which
are known to us from the beginning, and does not refuse to call Him that is begotten by the
name of ‘product of generation,’ since the generated essence itself” (as he says) “and the
appellation of ‘Son’ makes such a relation of words appropriate”,—how does he alienate the
Begotten from essential kindred with Him that begat Him? For in the case of those who are
called “sons” or “products” by way of reproach, or again where some praise accompanies
such names, we cannot say that any one is called “a child of wrath,” being at the same time
actually begotten by wrath; nor again had any one the day for his mother, in a corporeal
sense, that he should be called its son; but it is the difference of their will which gives occasion
for names of such relationship. Here, however, Eunomius says, “we do not refuse to call the
Son, seeing He is begotten, by the name of ‘product of generation,’ since the generated es-
599 Ps. xxix. 1 (LXX.).
600 1 Sam. ii. 12. The phrase is υἱοὶ λοιμοί, or “pestilent sons,” as in the LXX. Gregory’s argument would
seem to require the reading υἱοὶ λοιμοῦ.
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Thereafter he expounds the appellation of “Son,” and of “product of generation,”…