Chapter III.—Sins
May Be Divided into Corporeal and Spiritual. Both Equally Subject, If
Not to Human, Yet to Divine Investigation and Punishment.
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What things, then, they be for which repentance
seems just and due—that is, what things are to be set down under
the head of
sin
—the occasion indeed demands that I should
note down; but (to do so) may seem to be unnecessary. For when the Lord
is known, our spirit, having been “looked back
upon”
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by its own Author,
emerges unbidden into the knowledge of the truth; and being admitted to
(an acquaintance with) the divine precepts, is by them forthwith
instructed that “that from which God bids us abstain is to be
accounted
sin
:” inasmuch as, since it is generally
agreed that God is some great
essence
of good, of course nothing
but evil would be displeasing to good; in that, between things mutually
contrary, friendship there is none. Still it will not be irksome
briefly to touch upon the fact
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that, of sins, some
are carnal, that is, corporeal; some spiritual. For since man is
composed of this combination of a two-fold substance, the sources of
his sins are no other than the sources of his composition. But it is
not the fact that body and spirit are two things that constitute the
sins mutually different—otherwise they are on this account rather
equal
, because the
two
make up
one
—lest any
make the distinction between their
sins
proportionate to the
difference between their
substances
, so as to esteem the one
lighter, or else heavier, than the other: if it be true, (as it is,)
that both flesh and spirit are creatures of God; one wrought by His
hand, one consummated by His
afflatus
. Since, then, they equally
pertain to the Lord, whichever of them
sins
equally
offends
the Lord. Is it for you to distinguish the acts of the
flesh and the spirit, whose communion and conjunction in life, in
death, and in resurrection, are
so intimate, that “at that
time”
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they are equally
raised up either for life or else for judgment; because, to wit, they
have equally either sinned or lived innocently? This we would (once for
all) premise, in order that we may understand that no less necessity
for repentance is incumbent on
either
part of man, if in
anything it have sinned, than on
both
. The
guilt
of both
is common; common, too, is the
Judge
—God to wit; common,
therefore, is withal the healing medicine of repentance. The source
whence sins are named “spiritual” and
“corporeal” is the fact that every sin is matter either of
act
or else of
thought
: so that what is in
deed
is
“corporeal,” because a
deed
, like a
body
, is
capable of being
seen
and
touched
; what is in the
mind
is “spiritual,” because
spirit
is
neither
seen
nor
handled
: by which consideration is shown
that sins not of
deed
only, but of
will
too, are to be
shunned, and by repentance purged. For if human finitude
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judges only sins of
deed
, because it
is not equal to (piercing) the lurking-places of the
will
, let
us not on that account make light of crimes of the will in God’s
sight. God is all-sufficient. Nothing from whence any sin whatsoever
proceeds is remote from His sight; because He is neither ignorant, nor
does He omit to decree it to judgment. He is no dissembler of, nor
double-dealer with,
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His own
clear-sightedness. What (shall we say of the fact) that
will
is
the
origin
of
deed
? For if any sins are imputed to
chance, or to necessity, or to ignorance, let them see to themselves:
if these be excepted, there is no sinning save by
will
. Since,
then, will is the origin of deed, is it not so much the rather amenable
to penalty as it is first in guilt? Nor, if some difficulty interferes
with its full accomplishment, is it even in that case exonerated; for
it is itself imputed to itself: nor; having done the work which lay in
its own power, will it be excusable by reason of that miscarriage of
its accomplishment. In fact, how does the Lord demonstrate Himself as
adding a superstructure to the Law, except by interdicting sins of the
will
as well (as other sins); while He defines not only the man
who had actually invaded another’s wedlock to be an adulterer,
but likewise him who had contaminated (a woman) by the concupiscence of
his gaze?
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Accordingly it is
dangerous enough for the mind to set before itself what it is forbidden
to perform, and rashly through the will to perfect its execution. And
since the power of this will is such that, even without fully sating
its self-gratification, it stands for a deed; as a deed, therefore, it
shall be punished. It is utterly vain to say, “I
willed
,
but yet I
did
not.” Rather you
ought
to carry the
thing through,
because
you will; or else not to will, because
you do not carry it through. But, by the confession of your
consciousness, you pronounce your own condemnation. For if you eagerly
desired a
good
thing, you would have been anxious to carry it
through; in like manner, as you do not carry an
evil
thing
through, you ought not to have eagerly desired it. Wherever you take
your stand, you are fast bound by guilt; because you have either
willed
evil, or else have not
fulfilled
good.
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[Without reference to
Luther’s theory of justification, we must all adopt this as the
test of “a standing or falling church,” viz. “How
does it deal with sin and the sinner.”]
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Luke xxii. 61
.
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Or, “briefly to
lay down the rule.”
8436
i.e., in the
judgment-day. Compare the phrase “that day and that hour”
in Scripture.
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Mediocritas.
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Prævaricatorem:
comp.
ad Ux.
b. ii. c. ii.
ad init.
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Matt. v. 27, 28
; comp.
de Idol.
ii.