35
Chapter 21.—Cicero’s Opinion of the Roman Republic.
But if our adversaries do not care how foully and disgracefully the Roman republic be
stained by corrupt practices, so long only as it holds together and continues in being, and
if they therefore pooh-pooh the testimony of Sallust to its “utterly wicked and profligate”
condition, what will they make of Cicero’s statement, that even in his time it had become
entirely extinct, and that there remained extant no Roman republic at all? He introduces
Scipio (the Scipio who had destroyed Carthage) discussing the republic, at a time when
already there were presentiments of its speedy ruin by that corruption which Sallust de-
scribes. In fact, at the time when the discussion took place, one of the Gracchi, who, accord-
ing to Sallust, was the first great instigator of seditions, had already been put to death. His
death, indeed, is mentioned in the same book. Now Scipio, at the end of the second book,
says: “As among the different sounds which proceed from lyres, flutes, and the human
voice, there must be maintained a certain harmony which a cultivated ear cannot endure
to hear disturbed or jarring, but which may be elicited in full and absolute concord by the
modulation even of voices very unlike one another; so, where reason is allowed to modulate
the diverse elements of the state, there is obtained a perfect concord from the upper, lower,
and middle classes as from various sounds; and what musicians call harmony in singing, is
concord in matters of state, which is the strictest bond and best security of any republic,
and which by no ingenuity can be retained where justice has become extinct.” Then, when
he had expatiated somewhat more fully, and had more copiously illustrated the benefits of
its presence and the ruinous effects of its absence upon a state, Pilus, one of the company
present at the discussion, struck in and demanded that the question should be more thor-
oughly sifted, and that the subject of justice should be freely discussed for the sake of ascer-
taining what truth there was in the maxim which was then becoming daily more current,
that “the republic cannot be governed without injustice.” Scipio expressed his willingness
to have this maxim discussed and sifted, and gave it as his opinion that it was baseless, and
that no progress could be made in discussing the republic unless it was established, not only
that this maxim, that “the republic cannot be governed without injustice,” was false, but
also that the truth is, that it cannot be governed without the most absolute justice. And the
discussion of this question, being deferred till the next day, is carried on in the third book
with great animation. For Pilus himself undertook to defend the position that the republic
cannot be governed without injustice, at the same time being at special pains to clear himself
of any real participation in that opinion. He advocated with great keenness the cause of
injustice against justice, and endeavored by plausible reasons and examples to demonstrate
that the former is beneficial, the latter useless, to the republic. Then, at the request of the
company, Lælius attempted to defend justice, and strained every nerve to prove that nothing
is so hurtful to a state as injustice; and that without justice a republic can neither be governed,
nor even continue to exist.
Cicero’s Opinion of the Roman Republic.
96
Cicero’s Opinion of the Roman Republic.