Eunomius, something is held to be generate, we no longer hold the doctrine of the Divine
ungeneracy! And pray what has become of your subtle distinctions between generacy and
ungeneracy, by which you sought to establish the dissimilarity of the essence of the Son
from that of the Father? For it seems from what we are now being taught that the Father is
not dissimilar in essence when contemplated in respect of generacy, but that, in fact, if we
hold His ungeneracy, we reduce Him to non-existence; since “if we speak of the ages as
generate, we are driven to relinquish the Ungenerate.” But let us examine the force of the
argument, by which he would compel us to allow this absurdity. When, says he, those things
by comparison with which God is without beginning are non-existent, He Who is compared
with them must be non-existent also. What a sturdy and overpowering grip is this! How
tightly has this wrestler got us by the waist in his inextricable grasp! He says that God’s un-
generacy is added to Him through comparison with the ages. By whom is it so added? Who
is there that says that to Him Who hath no beginning ungeneracy is added as an acquisition
through comparison with something else? Neither such a word nor such a sense will be
found in any writings of ours. Our words indeed carry their own justification, and contain
nothing like what is alleged against us; and of the meaning of what is said, who can be a
more trustworthy interpreter than he who said it? Have not we, then, the better title to say
what we mean when we speak of the life of God as extending beyond the ages? And what
we say is what we have said already in our previous writings. But, says he, comparison with
the ages being impossible, it is impossible that any addition should accrue from it to God,
meaning of course that ungeneracy is an addition. Let him tell us by whom such an addition
has been made. If by himself, he becomes simply ridiculous in laying his own folly to our
charge: if by us, let him quote our words, and then we will admit the force of his accusation.
But I think we must pass over this and all that follows. For it is the mere trifling of
children who amuse themselves with beginning to build houses in sand. For having composed
a portion of a paragraph, and not yet brought it to a conclusion, he shows that the same life
is without beginning and without end, thus in his eagerness working out our own conclusion.
For this is just what we say; that the Divine life is one and continuous in itself, infinite and
eternal, in no wise bounded by any limit to its infinity. Thus far our opponent devotes his
labours and exertions to the truth as we represent it, showing that the same life is on no side
limited, whether we look at that part of it which was before the ages, or at that which succeeds
them. But in his next remarks he returns to his old confusion. For after saying that the same
life is without beginning and without end, leaving the subject of life, and ranging all the
ideas we entertain about the Divine life under one head, he unifies everything. If, says he,
the life is without beginning and without end, ungenerate and indestructible, then indes-
tructibility and ungeneracy will be the same thing, as will also the being without beginning
and without end. And to this he adds the aid of arguments. It is not possible, he says, for
the life to be one, unless indestructibility and ungeneracy are identical terms. An admirable
558
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.