yet Anaxagoras held the opinion that essential supreme Wisdom is mind, although it is not
the peculiar property of any living being, so to speak, since Truth is near to all souls alike
that are able to enjoy it. Observe, therefore, how wittily he concludes the argument: “Since
this is not the opinion of Anaxagoras” (i.e. seeing that he does not hold that that mind which
he calls God is girt about with an external body, through its relation to which it could be an
animal), “we must say that mind pure and simple, without the addition of anything” (i.e. of
any body) “through which it may exercise sensation, seems to be beyond the range and
conceptions of our intelligence.”2406
26. Nothing is more certain than that this lies beyond the range and conception of the
intelligence of Stoics and Epicureans, who cannot think of anything which is not material.
But by the word “our” intelligence he means “human” intelligence; and he very properly
does not say, “it lies beyond our intelligence,” but “it seems to lie beyond.” For their opinion
is, that this lies beyond the understanding of all men, and therefore they think that nothing
of the kind can be. But there are some whose intelligence apprehends, in so far as this is
given to man, the fact that there is pure and simple Wisdom and Truth, which is the peculiar
property of no living being, but which imparts wisdom and truth to all souls alike which
are susceptible of its influence. If Anaxagoras perceived the existence of this supreme Wis-
dom, and apprehended it to be God, and called it Mind, it is not by the mere name of this
philosopher—with whom, on account of his place in the remote antiquity of erudition, all
raw recruits in literature2407 (to adopt a military phrase) delight to boast an acquaint-
ance—that we are made learned and wise; nor is it even by our having the knowledge through
448
which he knew this truth. For truth ought to be dear to me not merely because it was not
unknown to Anaxagoras, but because, even though none of these philosophers had known
it, it is the truth.
27. If, therefore, it is unbecoming for us to be elated either by the knowledge of the man
who peradventure apprehended the truth, by which knowledge we obtain, as it were, the
appearance of learning, or even by the solid possession of the truth itself, whereby we obtain
real acquisitions in learning, how much less can the names and tenets of those men who
were in error assist us in Christian learning and in making known things obscure? For if we
be men, it would be more fitting that we should grieve on account of the errors into which
so many famous men fell, if we happen to hear of them, than that we should studiously in-
vestigate them, in order that, among men who are ignorant of them, we may enjoy the
gratification of a most contemptible conceit of knowledge. For how much better would it
be that I should never have heard the name of Democritus, than that I should now with
sorrow ponder the fact that a man was highly esteemed in his own age who thought that
2406 Cicero, de Natura Deorum, lib. 1.
2407 Litteriones ut militariter loquar.
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To Dioscorus