[56.] Number is a train of differences of ideas, put together in the mind’s consideration
in orderly succession, and considered with respect to their relations one to another, as in
that orderly mental succession. This mental succession is the succession of Time. One may
make which they will the first, if it be but the first in consideration. The mind begins where
it will, and runs through them successively one after another. It is a collection of differences;
for it is its being another, in some respect, that is the very thing that makes it capable of
pertaining to multiplicity. They must not merely be put together, in orderly succession; but
it’s only their being considered with reference to that relation, they have one to another as
differences, and in orderly mental succession, that denominates it Number.—To be of such
a particular number, is for an idea to have such a particular relation, and so considered by
the mind, to other differences put together with it, in orderly succession.—So that there is
nothing inexplicable in the nature of Number, but what Identity and Diversity is, and what
Succession, or Duration, or Priority and Posteriority, is.
[57.] Duration. Pastness, if I may make such a word, is nothing but a Mode of ideas.
This Mode, perhaps, is nothing else but a certain Veterascence, attending our ideas. When
it is, as we say, Past, the idea, after a particular manner, fades and grows old. When an idea
appears with this mode, we say it is Past, the idea, and according to the degree of this partic-
ular inexpressible mode, so we say the thing is longer or more lately past. As in distance, it
is not only by a natural trigonometry of the eyes, or a sort of parallax, that we determine it;
because we can judge of distances, as well with one eye, as with two. Nor is it by observing
the parallelism or aperture of the rays, for the mind judges by nothing, but the difference it
observes in the idea itself, which alone the mind has any notice of. But it judges of distance,
by a particular mode of indistinctness, as has been said before. So it is with respect to distance
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of time, by a certain peculiar inexpressible mode of fading and indistinctness, which I call
Veterascence.
[65.] I think we find by experience, that when we have been in a sound sleep, for many
hours together, if we look back to the time when we were last awake, the ideas seem farther
off to us, than when we have only ceased thinking a few minutes: which cannot be because
we see a longer train of intermediate ideas in one case, than in the other; for I suppose we
see none in neither. But there is a sort of Veterascence of ideas, that have been a longer time
in the mind. When we look upon them, they do not look just as those that are much nearer.
This Veterascence consists, I think, in blotting out the little distinctions, the minute parts,
and fine strokes of it. This is one way of judging of the distance of Visible objects. In this
respect, a house, a tree, do not look at a little distance, as they do very near. They not only
do not appear so big; but a multitude of the little distinctions vanish, that are plain when
we are near.
[53.] Sensation. Our Senses, when sound, and in ordinary circumstances, are not
properly fallible in any thing: that is, we mean our Experience by our Senses. If we mean
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NO.IV. Remarks in Mental Philosophy. The Mind.